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          Previous research has shown that Taiwan's military spending is affected either by 
China's military buildup or the US's military pipeline. This study investigates whether it 
is also true an ongoing US-China relationship has dynamic effects. Three major findings 
are obtained from the statistical analyses. First and foremost, the level of US-China 
conflict has a contemporaneous positive effect on Taiwan's military spending.  Second, 
the analyses also indicate that the volatility of US-China relations has negative effects on 
Taiwan's military spending. This finding suggests that instability in US-China relations 
will prompt Taiwan to decrease its military spending due to a higher amount of perceived 
security on the one hand, and Taiwan wants to avoid further provoking China on the 
other. Third, analyses indicate that an error correction model fares better than a simple 
budgetary incremental model in explaining the re-equilibrating effects of GNP growth on 
Taiwan's military spending. Overall, the results demonstrate the interplay of domestic and 
international constraints and may help to predict what will be the expected military 
spending when Taiwan's economy changes. I suggest that Taiwan's military spending is 
likely to be influenced by US-China relations as well as by foreign investment and 
domestic economic constraints as long as the United States policy toward the Taiwan 
problem remains unchanged.  
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1.1 Statement of the Problem 
          In the complex world of international relations, the Taiwan issue remains a 
principal difficulty in the relationship between the United States and China.  Observers of 
US-China relations have always used the term “the Taiwan problem” to signify the 
difficulty in properly handling the Taiwan issue.  Should the United States forge stronger 
and closer ties with Taiwan?  Should the United States sell weapons to Taiwan?  Should 
the United States establish cooperative or competitive relations with China? The answers 
to these questions, though seemingly straightforward, are not by any stretch of the 
imagination clear-cut.  Finding appropriate answers to these questions has baffled 
policymakers in Washington, Beijing, and Taipei.  Yet, one thing is clear.  The so-called 
“Taiwan problem” implicitly means that Taiwan is a pawn in this game between two big 
powers.1  That is, Taiwan’s security is determined by actions of the United States and 
China. 
         Unlike most pawns in extended deterrence games, however, Taiwan holds some 
interesting bargaining chips.  Taiwan is a vibrant emerging democracy with an equally 
vibrant economy.  Today, Taiwan holds the world’s third largest foreign exchange 
reserve, is among the world’s top 15 trading nations, and supplies close to 60 percent of 
the world’s information technology products.2  Geographically, Taiwan is strategically 
situated in one of the world’s most important sea-lanes.  Militarily, with armed forces of 
about 370,000, it is one of the strongest armed forces in East and Southeast Asia. 
1
 
         That said, Taiwan’s pariah status, due to lack of diplomatic relations with most 
countries in the world, makes actions by Taiwan’s chief ally –the United States – and 
Taiwan’s chief adversary – China – critical to Taiwan’s military security.  Foremost of 
these actions are the ebbs and flows in the relationship between the two powers.  Since 
the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 and the eventual de-
recognition of the Republic of China (ROC) in 1979, levels of conflict and cooperation 
between the United States and China have affected Taiwan’s perception of its own 
military security.   
         Some scholars have argued that a good US-China relationship is likely to benefit 
Taiwan and thereby enhances Taiwan’s security (Huang, Kim and Wu 1992; Vogel 1997; 
Roth 1999; Lin 2000; Lasater 2000; Tan and Yu 2001).  There are others such as Fisher 
(1998) and Wang (1998) who argue that an improved US-China relationship actually 
hurts Taiwan’s interest and therefore compromises its security.  However, other research 
contends that the United States strategic policy of maintaining the status quo makes US-
China relations irrelevant to Taiwan's security (Chen 1999).  These three contrasting 
scholarly views (which will be discussed in depth shortly) cannot possibly be supported 
by the same empirical reality.  The question that this dissertation examines, therefore, is 
the following: What is the impact of the US-China relationship on Taiwan’s military 
security?   More specifically, does conflict or cooperation between the United States and 






1.2 Historical Background  
         Understanding the historic background of the Taiwan problem will shed more light 
on the importance of an ongoing US-China relationship and its effects on Taiwan's 
military spending.  There are at least four basic conclusions regarding the Taiwan 
problem that can be drawn by examining the historical record.  First, among all the 
international actors, the United States plays the most important role in the relationship 
between China and Taiwan.  Second, US-China relations must be taken into account in 
any discussion of Taiwan's security.  Third, the US commitment to Taiwan's security 
contributes to peace between China and Taiwan and will likely grow increasingly vital. 
Fourth, volatility of the US-China relationship has significant effects on Taiwan's 
security, which are reflected in fluctuations in Taiwan's military spending.           
         Since 1949, Taiwan has been under the threat of invasion from the People’s 
Republic of China.  Nonetheless, with the United States acting as Taiwan’s security 
guarantor from 1949 to the present, the PRC has been kept at an arm’s length. 
         With rapprochement between the United States and China beginning with Richard 
Nixon’s visit to Beijing in 1972 and the eventual de-recognition of ROC (Taiwan) by the 
Carter administration in 1979, the nature of Taiwan’s security blanket was transformed 
dramatically.  Instead of relative clarity in the protection of Taiwan’s national security, 
the United States employs the so-called strategic ambiguity doctrine enacted in the 
Taiwan Relations Act (TRA).  Taiwan believed that it was left to fend for itself because 
of the increasing security uncertainty flowing from the US-China normalization (Tan and 
Yu 2001).  
         Taiwan's huge and generally increasing defense spending each year reflects its 
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worries concerning the PRC threat.  According to the US Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency (ACDA), Taiwan’s military spending consumed, on the average, 8.08% of its 
GNP during 1961-88.  By comparison, the average figure for all countries covered by this 
agency was 5.4% (Ward, Davis, and Chan 1993). 
         To better understand the reasons why Taiwan's military spending is so high relative 
to that of most countries in the world, I argue that an ongoing US-China relationship is 
one of the key external factors that should be subjected to close scrutiny.  Accordingly, 
this section reviews the historical evolution of US-China relations and its possible 
implications for Taiwan's military security.  For the sake of convenience, I categorize the 
history of US-China relations into five distinct periods--hostility, rapprochement, 
normalization, retrenchment, and engagement.  
1. Hostility (1949-1972) 
         During this period, the US-China relationship is basically hostile because of the 
occurrence of the Korean War (1950-53) and the Vietnam War (1964-75).  In addition, 
various confrontations between the United States and the Soviet Union blocs during the 
Cold War era further hardened the relationship between China and the United States.  
During this period of time, the United States took actions to isolate China, for example 
the imposition of an embargo, which lasted 21 years until April 1971, on all US exports 
to China.  The United States also imposed restrictions on travel and cultural exchanges by 
Americans with China; thus, the relationship between the two sides was very hostile 
(Chao and Myers 2000; Clough 1999; Cohen, Friedman, Hinton, and Whiting 1971; 
Gong 2000; Sheng 2001b; Tucker 2001).  
         On the other hand, Taiwan obtained the full support of the US military because of 
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its strategic and political importance.  MacArthur once argued: "Under no circumstance 
must Taiwan fall under Communist control.  Such an eventuality would at once threaten 
the freedom of the Philippines and the loss of Japan, and might well force out our frontier 
back to the coasts of California, Oregon, and Washington" (Cohen et al. 1971 pp. 41-42). 
In addition, the US-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty signed in 1954 put Taiwan under the 
direct protection of the US Seventh Fleet.  This served Taiwan as an indispensable 
insurance security policy until the termination of the treaty at the end of 1978 (Chan 
1988b, Huang 1997).  In general, Taiwan’s security was assured by the United States 
during this period of time.  
2. Rapprochement (1972-1978) 
         In this period, the United States took the initiative to restore a friendly relationship 
with the PRC in order to constrain the military expansion of the Soviet Union.  Richard 
Nixon visited Beijing in 1972 and signed the first Shanghai Joint Communiqué, in which 
Washington acknowledged a "one-China" policy.  Later on, Washington further 
recognized the PRC as the "sole" legal government of China in the 1978 Normalization 
Communiqué (Harry 1992).  Consequently, the United States terminated diplomatic ties 
with Taipei, abrogated the US-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty, and withdrew all its 
military personnel from the island.  The rapprochement of the US-China relationship cast 
Taiwan into panic in terms of national security because the United States supported the 
Albanian resolution calling for seating the People's Republic of China in the United 
Nations (UN).  Taiwan not only lost its representative membership in the United Nations 
but also many countries severed diplomatic ties.  The role of the United States as a 
military protector became more tacit, indirect, and problematic (Chan 1988b).  Taiwan 
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thus experienced considerable uncertainty about its security in this period. 
3. Normalization (1979-1989) 
         With the alleviation of mutual hostilities after the 1979 normalization, the United 
States and China agreed to differ by shelving the Taiwan dispute.  In 1979, in a 
rapprochement meeting with the Carter administration, the PRC insisted that the Taiwan 
issue is China's domestic affair, which was absolutely "non-negotiable" (Chang 1986). 
However, the United States did not yield to the PRC’s pressure and enacted the Taiwan 
Relations Act (TRA) in 1979, which insists that the Taiwan problem be settled through 
only peaceful means.  The TRA enjoins the United States to enable Taiwan to maintain a 
sufficient military capability to protect itself from possible PRC invasion.  During this 
period, Washington adopted a policy of strategic ambiguity toward China and Taiwan in 
order to achieve a peaceful balance of power between both sides of the Taiwan Strait. 
Taiwan’s security entered a relatively stable state in this period.  In other words, a better 
US-China relationship was conducive to Taiwan's security.  This may be because China 
is more confident that the United States will not support Taiwan's independence and thus 
feels less sensitive or hostile toward the Taiwan problem (Cohen et al. 1971 p.165).  On 
the other hand, the TRA also may reinforce Taiwan's confidence that the United States 
will not abandon Taiwan after the normalization of the US-China relationship. 
4. Retrenchment (1990-1994) 
         During this period, the US-China relationship reached its nadir since the 1979 
normalization.  The demise of the Soviet Union eroded the strategic importance of the 
PRC to counterbalance the Soviet Union in US strategic thinking.  Meanwhile, the 
Tiananmen massacre in 1989 galvanized ideological differences and prompted 
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confrontations between the United States and China.  In addition, proliferation of mass 
destructive weapons, human rights issues, trading frictions, and intellectual property 
rights issues led to further deterioration of the already tenuous US-China relationship.  
         However, the outbreak of the Gulf War in 1991 reduced hostility between the 
United States and China.  Closer cooperation between the two countries occurred because 
the former desired the latter to join the international coalition to use force against Iraq. 
But such cooperation did not last long; the US-China relationship turned chilly again 
when the Bush administration approved the sale of 150 F-16 A and F-16 B warplanes to 
Taiwan in 1992.  China lambasted the action as a clear violation of the 1982 
communiqué, in which the United States agreed to gradually phase out arms sale to 
Taiwan.  As one might gather from the above description, Taiwan’s sense of its own 
security changed drastically in this period. 
5. Engagement (1995-present) 
         During the period of Clinton's engagement policy with China, the US-China 
relationship has fluctuated.  In 1995, former president Lee Teng-hui obtained a visa to 
visit his alma mater, Cornell University.  China perceived this diplomatic breakthrough 
by Taiwan as a significant step toward Taiwanese independence and a sign of US support 
for such a move (Clough 1999, Gong 2000, Lasater and Yu 2000, Sheng 2001b).  To 
protest Lee's visit to the United States, China called back Li Daoyu, PRC ambassador to 
the United States, carried out live artillery exercises, and launched three waves of missile 
tests to intimidate Taiwan, in 1995 and 1996.  
         To show US commitment to a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan problem, the 
Clinton administration sent two aircraft carrier battle groups into Taiwanese waters and in 
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doing so perhaps prevented a military conflict and tragedy from occurring.3  During the 
1996 Taiwan crisis, the US-China relationship reached the brink of war, which further 
demonstrated the dangerous possibility of the Taiwan problem.  If not handled carefully, 
it could lead the United States and China to come into direct military confrontations 
(Clough 1999, Mann 2000, Sheng 2001b, Swaine and Mulvenon 2001).  
         In 1999, the US's bombardment of the Chinese embassy in Kosovo and, more 
recently, the 2001 confrontation over the EP3 reconnaissance plane, trapped the US-
China relationship in a cycle of escalation and de-escalation.  However, the Clinton 
administration never ceased its efforts to ameliorate the relationship.  In 1997 and 1998, 
the Clinton administration announced construction of a strategic partnership with the 
PRC.  A further shift in US foreign policy toward China became apparent in June 1998 
when President Clinton visited Beijing, where he made a public declaration of the Three-
No policy: no to support Taiwan independence, no to Taiwanese membership in 
international organizations, and no to any implicit diminution of the one-China policy 
(Gong 2000).  In 1999, China and the United States reached an agreement to allow the 
former to join the World Trade Organization (WTO).  Subsequently, approval by the US 
Congress of China's most-favored-nation (MFN) benefits on September 19, 2000, further 
demonstrated Clinton’s pro-China stance through adopting a de-linkage policy of human 
rights and trade issues.  The MFN status has been a US president's annual decision, 
required by the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Trade Act.  This is a cudgel of 
the United States to exert its influence on China to exact better adherence to human rights 
standards (Clough 1999).  However allured by the profitable nexus between China and 
the United States' two-side trades, Clinton administration gave up his "stick" without 
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even a fight.  Taiwan’s security was severely tested during this period, particularly in the 
1996 Taiwan Strait crisis.  However, due to limits imposed by data availability, this 
dissertation cannot conduct an empirical investigation of this most recent period.     
 
1.3 Significance of the Study 
         "The issue of Taiwan has all along been the most important issue at the heart of 
Sino-US relations" (China Agence France Presse, Sep. 2, 1999).  Why is Taiwan's 
military spending an issue worthy of attention and study?  The answer is intuitive because 
Taiwan is one of the world's most dangerous flashpoints--one that may lead China and 
the United States to a possible nuclear confrontation.  In addition, a study of Taiwan's 
military spending has long-term implications for regional and international security.  The 
peaceful resolution of the Taiwan problem is not only a grave concern of Beijing-
Taiwan-Washington but also a geo-strategic issue of balance of power in the Asia Pacific 
region. 
         The error correction model (detailed in Chapter 4) of Taiwan's military spending 
specified by this dissertation has considerable theoretical and empirical plausibility.  In 
all cases, the model is shown to be highly resilient and can explain approximately 90% of 
the variance in the evolution of Taiwan's military spending.  Furthermore, this study 
clearly points out that there is a linkage between Taiwan's military spending and factors 
such as domestic economic growth, foreign investment, saving rate, and, consistent with 
my argument above, the volatility of the US-China relationship.  
         Both external and internal factors that affect Taiwan's military spending are 
summarized and shown to have significant effects in this study.  In particular, the external 
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factor, an ongoing US-China relationship, determines the priority of Taiwan's national 
defense.  On the other hand, the internal factors such as GNP, foreign investment, and 
saving rate fulfill the economic and financial feasibility of Taiwan's military spending.  
         Previous studies (Chan 1988a, 1988b; Huang, Kim, and Wu 1992; Huang 1997; 
Davis 2000; Gong 2000; Lasater and Yu 2000; Lasater 2001; Lijun 2001; Li, Hu and 
Zhong 1998) have considered the roles of China and the United States and their effects 
on Taiwan's military spending.  However, little attention has been paid to the ongoing 
US-China relationship and its dynamic effects on Taiwan's military outlays.  Measuring 
ongoing US-China relations allows this dissertation to capture directly the factors that 
have a bearing on the level of Taiwan's military spending. 
         Most arms race models are based on the action-reaction assumption that military 
outlays are related to a rival nation's military spending (Majeski 1985).  This dissertation 
goes beyond this traditional view and points out that the uncertainty of US commitment 
indicated by the level of US-China hostility and volatility is a factor affecting Taiwan's 
military spending.  The empirical evidence of this study infers that heightened tension 
between China and the United States may be harmful to Taiwan, as reflected by a drastic 
increase in its military spending, which is bad news for Taiwan's economic prosperity. 
On the other hand, a higher volatility in the US-China relationship at time t-1 is in 
Taiwan's favor as followed by a lower level in its next year's military budget share.  That 
implies that Taiwan is cautious about any possible provocations to China and wants to 
avoid Chinese military adventurism to Taiwan.  
         The results of this study may be of interest to researchers in the area of US-China 
policy, East Asian security, alliances, and arms control who wish to have a better 
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understanding of the effects of US-China dyadic interactions and underlying motivations 
of Taiwan's military spending as these are important to the stability and security in Asia's 
Pacific region.  The error correction model specified in this study is able to capture both 
short-run and long-run effects of GNP on military spending (detailed in Chapter 5) and 
may aid researchers to better predict Taiwan's military spending under varying 
conditions. 
 
1.4 Organization of the Study 
         This dissertation consists of six chapters.  Chapter One has presented the statement 
of the problem, the historical background of US-China-Taiwan relationships, and 
discusses the significance and organization of the study.  The historical material provided 
by this chapter sheds light on the effects of US-China hostility on Taiwan's military 
security.  The chapter also discusses the importance of the theoretical and methodological 
contributions of the dissertation for comprehending Taiwan's military spending, and, 
more specifically, for predicting short-run and long-run effects of GNP growth on 
military spending.  
         Chapter Two develops the research project and the major theses by reviewing 
existing literature about the arms race, external threat, military spending, and economic 
growth.  This chapter provides an integrated set of hypotheses of external effects such as 
US-China hostility, volatility, and the PRC's military spending and internal effects such 
as economic growth, saving rate, and foreign investment, on Taiwan's military spending. 
This chapter discusses measuring the nature of the ongoing US-China relationship, which 




         Chapter Three establishes the theoretical framework of this dissertation.  A diagram 
for the statistical outcomes of Taiwan's military spending will be illustrated and 
discussed.  Taiwan's military spending is affected by the ongoing relationship between 
the United States and China.  Taiwan is sensitive to any possible change of US 
commitment toward its security, and this will be reflected in its military spending on an 
annual basis.  To Taiwan, a change of US commitment is equal to a threat to its security. 
Without the United States' military and political support, Taiwan will lose its qualitative 
advantages in facing its numerically advantaged adversary, China.  In other words, 
security and threat are treated as two sides of the same coin.  Specifically, a high degree 
of threat implies a low amount of security, which, in turn, leads to an increase in military 
spending.  Subsequently, a greater amount of security will result in a lower level of 
military spending in response.   
         Chapter Four focuses on describing data and the operationalization and 
measurement of variables.  A 28-point-scale taken from the WEIS data set is employed to 
measure the major independent variable, the index of US-China conflict or hostility.  In 
addition, all variables are subject to diagnostic tests necessary prior to including them in 
the time series analyses to come.  This chapter also provides a description of all the 
variables employed in the hypotheses and describes possible explanations for patterns 
observed in the data.  The operationalization and measurement of the dependent variable 
and independent variables are discussed together with the method of data collection and 
method of analysis.  
         Chapter Five examines the problems encountered in this study and discusses the 
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appropriate methodology used to remedy them.  A brief discussion related to 
methodological issues, such as stationarity, cointegration, autocorrelation, 
heteroskedasticity, normality, and non-linearity also are addressed.  In this chapter, I 
further summarize the statistical findings, illustrate the substantive importance of 
coefficients, and discuss their prominence and policy relevance.  I will report the results 
of the tests of each hypothesis and identify the relative influence of different factors in 
the Taiwan experience with respect to the external and internal effects on military 
spending.  Some policy suggestions to Washington-Beijing-Taipei trilateral parties are 
discussed.  
         Finally, in Chapter Six, I will summarize the findings and discuss their implications 
on the future US-China relationship and its possible effects on Taiwan's security and 


























1. Chan, Clarke, and Davis (1996 p. 112) first point out that, in the early 1950s, Taiwan    
    has appeared to many observers to be destined for the fate of a pawn in the  
    intensifying superpower rivalry, and that of an economic and political basket case.  
    With the defeat of the Kuomintang in the Chinese civil war and its withdrawal from  
the mainland, Taiwan had to bear the brunt of the ensuing population exodus and  
    tremendous military burden in dealing with the constant military threat from the PRC.  
    Facing the tottering economy and possible collapse from within, Taiwan's existence  
    would have been problematic were it not for the timely and massive US aid and  
    support.  As far as Taiwan is concerned, it is usually the plight of being a pawn state.  
    The incentives that induce the United States to be willing to come to Taiwan's aid are  
    largely beyond Taiwan's ability to control or sustain.  In other words, Taiwan cannot  
    take for granted that the United States will come to its defense in the event of PRC  
    invasion.  What Taipei can do is to try its best to strengthen pragmatic ties with  
    Washington to ensure the continuation of obtaining the weapon systems necessary for  
    its military security. 
 
2. "By 1998, Taiwan was the world's largest supplier of computer monitors, modems,  
    motherboards, keyboards, power supplies, scanners, printing devices, and desktop and  
    notebook computers.  In 2000 Taiwan notebook computer suppliers occupied an 
    approximately 60 percent share of the world markets" (Bolt 2001 p. 93). 
 
3. The two battle groups include: "the nuclear attack submarines Portsmouth, Columbus  
    and Bremerton; the aircraft carriers Independence and Nimitz; the destroyers O'Brien  
    and Hewitt, the guided missile frigate McClusky, the oiler Pecos, and the guided  
    missile crusiers Bunker Hill with the Independence; and the crusier Port Royal, the  
    destroyers Callaghan and Oldendorf, the frigate Ford, and the replenishment ships  















         "No relationship is more critical for international stability than that of China  
           and the United States.  No issue is more significant and potentially more 
           explosive than Taiwan." 
                      
                                                     ---Harold Brown, former US Secretary of Defense 2000 
  
 
         The enduring rivalry of the relationship between the United States and China not 
only threatens the security of Taiwan but also plants a destabilizing seed in East Asia. 
Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (1995) straightforwardly points out that instability across the Taiwan 
Strait greatly threatens the national security of the United States and endangers the 
stability of the Asian Pacific region.  Therefore, Taiwan's military buildup is noteworthy 
and it behooves researchers of international relations to determine the most plausible 
explanations for the high level of military spending that has taken place in Taiwan. 
         Traditionally, two principal types of theories have been used to explain the causes 
and effects of military spending.  The first type of theory focuses on influences 
exogenous to a country, and the second type of theory focuses primarily on internal 
considerations. 
 
2.1 External Factors  
         Research on external threats and military spending abounds (Bennet 1996; Bolks 
1999; Bolks and Stoll 2000; Cusack 1985; Cusack and Ward 198; Fearon 1994; Gastillo 
et al. 2001; Lebovic and Ishaq 1987; Nincic 1983; Oren 1996; Reiter 1996; Singer 1958; 
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Saris and Middendorp 1980; Ward 1984; Ward and Mahajan 1984;).  Most researchers in 
the first tradition rely on the pioneering work of Lewis Richardson (1960).  Richardson 
presented the first theory of dynamic effects of the arms race, and argued that the driving 
force behind fluctuations in military spending was the action-reaction between two rival 
nations.  That is, arms race is a process in which changes in a nation's military spending 
are driven by its opponent's defense expenditures (Richardson 1960; Li, Hu and Zhong 
1998 p. 169).  There is vast literature on this topic, ranging across the disciplines of 
political science, economics, sociology, and psychology.  Recent empirical work includes 
Anderton (1989), Bolks and Stoll (2000), Chan (1990), Cusack and Ward (1981), Dasai 
and Blake (1981), Intriligator and Brito (1993), Kydd (2000), Majeski (1985), Majeski 
and Jones (1981), Marra (1986), McGinnis (1991), Moll and Luebbert (1980), Ninic 
(1982), Ostrom and Oren (1996), Smith (1977), Squires (1982), Ward and Mahajan 
(1984), and Wsard (1984).  
         Although conceptually quite compelling, Richardson's model has met with at best 
mixed empirical success particularly when applied to the case of Taiwan.  Steve Chan 
(1988a, 1988b) indicates that the Richardson model of reciprocal armament escalation 
can at best only partially explain Taiwan's military spending, because the PRC's defense 
behavior is far more likely to be influenced by its traditional and potential adversaries 
such as India, Japan, Russia or the United States than from Taiwan (see also Bolks and 
Stoll 2000; Kynge and Fidler 1999; Li, Hu and Zhong 1998).1  Chan's empirical finding 
bolsters his argument that China's military outlays at time t-1 have a negative and 
statistically insignificant effect on Taiwan's military spending. 
         Richardson (1960 p. 62) offered two possible explanations for such a negative 
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relationship.  First, an inverse relationship is consistent with the adoption of the virtuous 
precept to return good for evil.  The second reason, submissiveness, refers to the special 
condition in which a weak nation is dwarfed by the strength of its adversary and would 
submit rather than engage in a hopeless arms competition (see also Oren 1996).  These 
two explanations are not applicable to the case of Taiwan.  
         Wohlstetter (1974b p. 80) further points out: “The trouble with most arms race 
theories has been that they start by assuming an accelerating competition and then look 
about for some mechanism that might conceivably explain it.”  As far as Taiwan is 
concerned, I argue that the ongoing US-China relationship is the underlying motivation 
rather than the PRC's military expenditures per se that affects variations of Taiwan’s 
military spending.  This argument will be specified in greater detail as the analysis 
progresses. 
         After recognizing the limitations in applying a Richardson model to the case of 
Taiwan, this dissertation investigates how the ongoing US-China relationship affects 
Taiwan's military spending.  In "Taiwan's Calculation on Military Spending," Chan 
(1988b p. 913) puts it briefly but clearly:  
     
         "The effectiveness of the US's coat-tailing (providing a security umbrella) Taiwan  
         in part depends paradoxically on Washington's leverage in Peking, which in turn  
         reflects and perhaps even presumes to some extent an ongoing Sino-American  
         relationship."   
 
 
         Following Chan's suggestion, this dissertation investigates the impact of US-China 
relations on Taiwan's military spending.  In his article, Chan simply tested the impact of 
the PRC threat (measured by PRC military outlays) and the US pipeline (measured by US 
military outlays) respectively.  This dissertation goes further by assessing the dynamic 
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effects of US-China relations on Taiwan’s military spending.    
         Until now, three kinds of arguments have been made concerning the nature of the 
relationship between the United States and China and its impact on Taiwan's military 
spending.2  Ezra F. Vogel (1997) suggests that the key to managing the Taiwan problem 
is for the United States to have a better relationship with China.  Enjoying a better 
political and economic relationship with the United States, Beijing might feel confident 
that it eventually could achieve a peaceful integration of Taiwan and thus would show 
less hostility toward Taiwan.  Lin Cheng-yi (2000, p. 6) argues: " An improved and stable 
US-PRC relationship could contribute to the security of Taiwan."  The reason is that 
improved relations between China and the United States help maintain peace in Taiwan 
Straits.  Beijing would be more likely to accommodate Washington on the Taiwan issue 
(see also Lee 1995), because it feels more confident that the United States will be less 
likely to support the independence of Taiwan and will be more compromised to its 
position in dealing with the Taiwan problem.  
         In addition, American policymakers expect that improved US-China relations, 
achieved by approving China's permanent trade benefits and helping China enter the 
WTO, may drastically change China's cost calculation in resolving conflicts by use of 
force.  In other words, US policy thinking is based on the premise that the better the US-
China relations, the less likely the PRC is to invade Taiwan (Tan and Yu 2001).  
         Concurrently, Lasater (2001) suggests that the worse the Sino-American 
relationship becomes, the more sensitive the Taiwan problem will be, therefore the more 
likely the military confrontation will grow.  Stanley O. Roth (1999, p. 178) points out that 
the improvement in US-PRC relations not only did not harm Taiwan, but also 
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significantly contributed to Taiwan's extraordinary economic and political development. 
Huang, Kim and Wu (1992 p. 56) in their empirical investigation found that the better the 
US-PRC relationship, the less likely that the PRC would come into conflict with Taiwan. 
But this finding is opposite to their expectation that an improvement in the US-China 
relationship will increase the likelihood of China's initiating a conflict against Taiwan. 
         Conversely, Richard Fisher (1998) of the Heritage Foundation warns that closer US 
ties with the PRC at the expense of Taiwan could jeopardize the latter's military security. 
The United States would be more likely to yield to the PRC's pressure to reduce its arms 
sales to Taiwan.  Without US weapons, Taiwan will eventually lose its qualitative 
advantage in terms of military capabilities, which, in turn, will greatly impair Taiwan's 
military security.  Besides, Taiwan's leadership treats US arms sales to Taiwan as a very 
important indicator of US political support, which is crucial to Taiwan's survival.3 
Stephen J. Yates (2001) states that US arms sales to Taiwan are crucial because Taiwan's 
military strength will promote peace through deterrence, while its weakness will only 
invite aggression and invasion.  If arms sales are more apt to occur when US-China 
relations are poor, then it follows that poor US-China relations are good for Taiwan. 
         According to this view, Taipei cannot afford to lose Washington's military and 
political support.  Besides, improved US-China relations may lead the PRC to adopt a 
more adventuresome military strategy toward the Taiwan dispute, by leading it to 
anticipate that the United States will compromise its defense commitment.  Wang (1998) 
and Lin (2000) argue that the occurrence of the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis partially 
resulted from the compromising attitude of the Clinton administration towards the PRC.   
         In contrast, Chen Chien-ming (1999) suggests that US-China relations do not have a 
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prominent effect on Taiwan's military security.  He further argues that only if a balance-
of-power exists among Washington-Beijing-Taipei trilateral relations, can the military 
security of Taiwan be ensured.  If the United States only attempts to play a balancing role 
between China and Taiwan, it will not anticipate any specific resolution of the Taiwan 
issue and will let the problem be solved by both sides of the Taiwan Strait on their own. 
In other words, the United States will not tilt against either side.  If this is the case, the 
US-China relationship in actuality is irrelevant to Taiwan's military spending or security 
because neither China nor Taiwan can affect the US policy of status quo.  This is a 
typical example following the classical rule of international relations, that the strong do 
as they please and the weak do as they must. 
         It is with these inconsistencies in mind that this dissertation aims to examine the 
relationship between US-China relations with Taiwan's military spending.  More 
specifically, this study addresses the questions: Is the US-China relationship critical in 
determining Taiwan's military spending?  Do changes in the level of hostility in US-
China relations affect Taiwan's military spending?  In answering these questions, I 
attempt to connect the study of US-China relations to the broader and more fundamental 
issue of the perception of external threat and its consequent impact on military spending. 
         The nature of the relationship between Taiwan's security, external threat, and 
military spending is still controversial; however, I argue that security and threat are two 
sides of the same coin and are reflected on the fluctuations of military spending on an 
annual basis.  In other words, a higher level of external threat means less security and will 
be associated with a higher level of military spending.  Similarly, a lower level of threat 
means more security and will be responded to by a lower level of military spending 
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(Ward and Mahajan 1984).  Following this logic between security and spending, I argue 
that a worse US-China relationship is beneficial to Taiwan’s security, and will prompt a 
lower level of military spending.  The reason may be because the United States will be 
less likely to forsake Taiwan when the US-China relationship is poor, which means a 
higher sense of security to Taiwan.  This might partially explain Chan's finding of a 
negative relationship between PRC military spending and that of Taiwan. 
         In contrast, it also could be the case that a less hostile US-China relationship is 
conducive to Taiwan’s security.  If this is true, then we can conjecture that improved US-
China relations can spill over to relax tensions across the Taiwan Straits.  Therefore, 
Taiwan will perceive itself as more secure and will be more likely to decrease its military 
spending.  By the same token, the escalation of conflict between the United States and 
China may lead to higher tensions between China and Taiwan that, in turn, may make the 
latter feel insecure.  As a result, Taiwan will immediately boost its military expenditure to 
alleviate the perceived threat. 
         If Taiwan perceives the United States to be a balancer, one would not expect any 
effects of US-China relations on the level of Taiwan’s military spending.  If this case 
obtains then internal factors would be the major determinants of Taiwan’s military 
spending as will be discussed in the next section. 
 
2.2 Internal Factors  
         The second line of thought that will be pursued in this dissertation focuses on 
internal considerations rather than external ones in explaining variations in military 
spending. Among these internal factors are the nature of the budgetary process and the 
21
 
political economy of military spending.  
1. The Budgetary Process 
         Harris (1986 p. 14) examined the importance of endogenous economic factors on 
military spending levels in five ASEAN countries--Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, and Thailand. He concluded that: 
 
         "…economic conditions, especially government current revenue, appear to exert at   
         least a moderate influence on annual changes in defense expenditure in ASEAN…A    
         nation's GNP sets a broad limit on its domestically-financed defense expenditure,  
         and that defense expenditure in the previous year is a good indicator of its level in    
         the next year." 
 
         This argument is congruent with the theory of the budgetary process, which 
maintains that the dynamics of military spending are based primarily on organizational 
inertia within the state.  The main proposition underlying the theory is that decision-
makers employ standard operating procedures (SOPs) for implementing the rules of 
bureaucracies.  It further can be inferred that the best indicators of new increments to 
military spending are simply those which obtained in the immediate past (Chan 1988a, 
1988b; Chung 1996; Harris 1986; Li, Hu and Zhong 1998; Solomon 1998). 
         According to the incremental budgetary model, increases in military spending are 
determined by a simple series of decisions ordered in time (Castillo et al. 2001; Choucri 
and North 1975; Chung 1996; Harris 1986; Kamelt and Mowery 1987; Moll and 
Luebbert 1980; Ostrom 1977, 1978; Ward 1984; Ostrom and Mara 1986; Wildavski 
1964; Russet 1970).  In other words, one can predict the current military spending budget 
based on the immediately preceding, time t-1 budget.  This perspective implies that the 
base year's spending suggests what is plausible and what is needed for determining the 
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next year's spending level (Castillo et al. 2001).  Rattinger (1975) found that past 
expenditures are the best single indicator in explaining military spending for all members 
of European NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organizations.  So one potential explanation 
of the determinant of military spending is the bureaucratic politics of the budgeting 
process represented by incrementalism (Solomon 1998).4  
 
2. Guns and Butter 
         The theory of political economy of military spending focuses on the relationship 
between military spending and economic growth.  Three main views of the defense-
growth relationship are incorporated in the theory of political economy and military 
spending.  Those are the military Keynesian view, the Marxist view, and the "Rich 
nation, strong army" view (Chung 1996, Looney 1989, Mosley 1985, Threddenick 1985). 
The military Keynesian and Marxist theoretical formulations contend that the direction of 
the defense-growth relationship runs from military spending to economic growth, not 
vice versa.  But "Rich nation, strong army" theorists propose the direction of the 
relationship runs from economic growth to military spending.  They argue that increased 
state activity and the corresponding increases in military spending are an inevitable 
accompaniment of economic growth (Chung 1996).  Richer countries are likely to devote 
a larger proportion of their budgets to defense (Cusack and Ward 1981; Chung 1996 p. 
304; Looney 1989 p. 38; Thorn 1967).  This dissertation focuses mainly on the "Rich 
country, strong army" assumption in the case of Taiwan because it is congruent with the 
theoretical formulation posited by this dissertation.   
         The direction of causality seems to be fairly consistent with the common belief, 
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'Rich country; strong army' (Fuquo-Chyangpin), that is, when a society is getting richer, 
people are more likely to encourage the state authority to provide more and better goods 
and services.  Joerding (1986 p. 38) first conducts a Granger Causality test on economic 
growth and defense spending.  He finds that it is economic growth that Granger causes 
military spending, not the other way around.  Based on empirical research on data 
gathered from 1965 to 1987, Looney (1994) points out that economic growth has a 
significant positive impact on military spending.  Smith (1977) also found that defense 
spending is a positive function of economic growth as well as security variables based on 
threat evaluation and military alliances.  Chowdhury (1991) and Kusi (1994) suggest that 
the higher the economic growth, the greater the military expenditures.  Gastillo et al. 
(2001 p. 36) further point out two plausible reasons about why economic growth will lead 
to increases in military expenditures.  The first is because as nations become wealthier 
they believe they have more to protect.  Second, greater wealth allows nations to pursue 
aggressive foreign policy objectives considered unobtainable before.  Given these 
findings, one can plausibly assume that countries with rapid economic growth are more 
able to indulge themselves in the luxury of defense programs, just as rich families are 
usually more able to purchase security insurance than poor families (Chung 1996, Clough 
1999, Gastillo et al. 2001, Gong 2000).  Chung (1996) further points out that rapidly 
rising incomes might produce an even more rapidly rising level of tax revenues of which 
the powerful defense lobby might be expected to secure a proportional share.  In contrast 
to the arms race literature, Harris (1986), Hewitt (1992), Looney (1987, 1989a, 1989b), 
Looney and Frederiksen (1986, 1988, 1990), and Maizels and Nissanke (1986) all 
indicate that economic variables show great promise in providing a more accurate picture 
24
 
as to underlying causes of military spending levels.  
         Threddenick (1985) tested the impact of economic variables on the pattern of 
Canadian military spending.  He concluded that "recent large increases in Canadian 
defense expenditures have been influenced more by economic growth than by security 
considerations" (p. 78).  Solomon (1998 p. 64) in research on the case of South Korea 
also argues: 
         
         "As its economy grows, a nation has more resources with which to provide   
         security.  In a broad sense, the production possibility curve of a country moves as  
         the GNP grows, enabling the society to enjoy more military security as well as  
         civilian output.  Therefore, military expenditures and GNP are hypothesized to be  
         positively related so that defense is a normal good whose demand rises with  
         income." 
 
         In the context of Taiwan, the relationship between economic growth and military 
spending has been of considerable interest to political scientists.  According to Steve 
Chan (1988a, 1988b), what makes the case of Taiwan theoretically challenging is that it 
is often identified as an outlier case, an "enigma" to unravel (Clark 1989). Chan (1988a p. 
913) states: 
      
         "Taiwan has achieved one of the highest rates in gross national product and most  
         sustained growth rates in gross national product (GNP) at an average annual rate of  
         8.8% during 1952-85 and in exports at an average annual rate of 24% during 1953- 
         85 in the world.  Its saving rates, its inflation rate, and its unemployment rate again  
         rank it among the top performers globally. "  
 
      
         The "enigma" of the coexistence of rapid economic growth and high military 
expenditure in Taiwan seems to indicate that its economic growth is conducive to its 
military spending.  Following this line of thinking, I hypothesize that economic growth 
has significant impact on Taiwan's military spending.  However, no theoretical consensus 
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or empirical tests of hypotheses concerning the Taiwan enigma have been achieved so 
far.  Steve Chan (1988b p. 27) calls for more research to be undertaken to unravel the 
puzzles posed by the Taiwanese experience.  
 
2.3 The Integrated Model 
         In addition to action-reaction theory, Richardson also takes into account the 
hostility and the economic burden of producing and maintaining arms when modeling an 
arms race (Intriligator and Brito 1990; Li, Hu and Zhong 1998).  Bolks and Stoll (2000) 
argue that most of the arms race literature ignores hostility in the international 
environment that can have an impact on armaments decisions.  They observe that failure 
to include a measure of environmental hostility will underspecify significantly the 
external factors that drive decisions about the level of military spending.  Nincic (1983) 
indicates that domestic economic factors were more influential than external threats as 
determinants of annual fluctuations in Soviet military spending.  However, Bolks and 
Stoll (2000), Gastillo, Lowell, Tellis, Munoz, and Zycher (2001), Looney (1989), and 
Ostrom (1978) argue that both the internal and external environments affect a country's 
defense spending.  To unravel the Taiwan enigma, I suggest that the external threat, real 
or perceived, be taken into account along with the domestic economic constraints.   
         Taiwan's military spending is directly connected to its demand for security because 
it has been faced with a lopsided numerically advantaged enemy, the PRC.  Within a 
stark and brutal self-help international system, Taiwan not only has to reinforce its own 
military buildup independently but simultaneously must seek external alliances in order 
to alleviate the threat posed by its archenemy, China.  To a great extent, US support is 
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critical in providing the wherewithal for Taiwan to maintain a qualitative edge, in order 
to compensate for its quantitative inferiority (Chan 1988b).  In addition, Taiwan's 
economic growth also plays a very important role in supporting its heavy defense burden 
and ensuring its security.  To achieve this goal, Taiwan has to retain a balanced 
relationship between China and the United States to survive.  A close relationship with 
the United States allows Taiwan to equip itself with arms and alliances to deter China's 
invasion while a good relationship with China provides Taiwan access to China's 
markets, which is essential to Taiwan's economic livelihood.  I therefore argue that US-
China relations and economic conditions are the two most important factors that should 
be taken into account in any attempt to explain the dynamics of Taiwan's military 
spending.          
         In this dissertation, I will employ an integrated model that incorporates the 
conflictual levels of competing nations to investigate their effects (operationalized as US-
China hostility) on Taiwan's military spending.  This study focuses on the causal 
relationship between external threat (US-China conflictual interactions) and economic 
growth, and military spending.  The scope of this dissertation is confined to Taiwan 
(ROC), China (PRC), and the United States.  I contend that the dyadic relationship 
between the United States and China is one of the most important causal variables, 
which, taken along with domestic factors such as economic growth, saving rate, and 
foreign investment, drive Taiwan's military spending (Lipow and Antinori 1995, Heo and 
Ro 1998, Sun and Yu 1999).  
         As far as Taiwan’s experience is concerned, external threat as well as economic 
growth seems to boost military spending.  Benoit (1978 p. 271) points out that "countries 
27
 
with a heavy defense burden generally had the most rapid rate of growth, and those with 
the lowest defense burdens tended to show the lowest growth rates."  His study finds that 
14 countries out of 44 Less Developed Countries with the highest defense burdens and 
economic growth in the sample have all been engaged in wars or seriously threatened by 
them, or been in peculiarly exposed strategic positions (Lipow and Antinori 1995). 
Benoit (1973, 1978) further suggests that there is a possible psychological linkage 
between defense spending and economic growth.  An external crisis will facilitate closer 
cooperation and a stronger motivation to work together among people.  The result will be 
to boost economic growth, which permits increased military spending.  Israel, Taiwan, 
Singapore, and South Korea are the exemplary cases of these relationships.  With these 
considerations in mind, I employ an integrated model specified to investigate the 
dynamic impact of external threats (i.e., the level of conflicts between the United States 
and China) and economic growth on Taiwan’s military spending.  
         In sum, as is evident from the preceding discussions three main theoretical 
perspectives each seems to contribute to an explanation of Taiwan's military spending. 
Both external and internal factors must be considered in explaining Taiwan's military 
spending.  Following this line of thinking, I propose a set of hypotheses based on an 









1. According to Sun and Yu (1999), since the Korean War, the United States was 
viewed as China's number one enemy until the early 1970s.  Even after 1979, when a 
formal diplomatic relationship was established between the two countries, the United 
States was still perceived by China as a major threat.  On the other hand, the Sino-
Soviet relationship deteriorated dramatically in the 1960s, which led to several 
serious border clashes in 1969 along the Ussuri and Amur rivers.  Subsequently, the 
Soviet Union became China's number one archenemy until the mid-1980s.  India had 
several border military confrontations and wars with China from 1959 to 1962. Since 
then it was treated as one of China's military threats until 1979.  Japan has been 
treated as a rival of China, partly because of the bitter memory associated with its 
invasion of China in the 1930s, and partly because Japan is a close ally of the United 
States.  Taiwan also is regarded as a long-time military rival of China, but because of 
its relatively small size and military strength it brings no major threat to China. 
 
2. To ensure its military security, Taiwan has adopted the strategy of building an 
"independent defense system" and "replacing quantity with higher quality" (Lee 1995 
p. 361).  To achieve this goal, Taipei has substantially increased its military 
expenditure over time.  Taiwan's military budget reached $11 billion in 1993, a 
prominent increase from the $2.784 billion in 1979 (FBIS-China September 23, 
1993). Taipei has enforced its military security with weapons purchased from the 
United States and France (Lee 1995).  In addition, Former Premier Hao Pei-tsun also 
argues that Taiwan cannot reduce its defense budget because the PRC's threat to 
Taiwan has increased in light of the PRC's increasing military budget and build-up 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union (FBIS-China March 30, 1992).  From the 
above evidence, we can further infer that Taiwan's military spending is closely tied to 
its perception of its own military security.  
 
3. "Lee Tung-hui views weaponry more as a symbol of reassurance and resolve than as 
a key component of a larger force structure designed to attain genuine warfighting 
objectives, because he values US-supplied weapons systems as a critical indicator of 
greater US support (military as well as political) for Taiwan" (Rand p. 16). 
 
4.   According to Ward and Hanajan (1984), incrementalism is perceived to be especially  
      important in the budgetary decision-making process because it implies that historical  
      base.  That is, what was spent or allocated last year, is a given from which to proceed  
      in making calculations about what is needed and/or plausible in the subsequent or  
      current period.  Combined with assumptions about normal organizational behavior,  
      this incremental aspect suggests that military expenditures tend to increase  
      themselves over time: Next year's budget will be based on this year's, plus a little  








THEORETICAL FORMULATION AND HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
     
         "The ROC (Taiwan) in addition to cementing its links with the United States  
           has also sought to develop mutually beneficial interaction with the PRC, as  
           a means of strengthening the security of Taiwan"  
                                                                                     ---Ralph N. Clough (1999 p. 24) 
 
         Security commitment, threat perception, and military expenditures in arms race 
processes have long been important research foci in international relations.  For arms 
race's action-reaction theory, the Taiwanese case shows how a client state's military 
spending is not only a direct function of external threat but also threats as reflected 
through perceptions of its patron's commitment (Cha 2000).  In this dissertation, I argue 
that the level of commitment signaled by the United States to Taiwan is refracted through 
its bilateral interactions with China, and conditions Taiwan's military spending and 
perceptions of external threat.  That is, Taiwan's leadership tends to believe that a more 
reliable US commitment when the US-China relationship turns sour can increase 
Taiwan's security by balancing against military threats posed by powerful China. 
Whereby, Taiwan's perception of a greater external security or lesser external threat will 
result in a lower level of Taiwan's military spending in response.  
         An alliance with the United States (external balancing) can provide Taiwan with 
additional strength and a more deterrent posture toward China.  Therefore, as far as 
Taiwan is concerned, a stronger perceived US commitment is equal to more security or 
less external threat.  Consequently, this will lead to a decrease in Taiwan's military 
spending.  In addition, if Taipei perceives a weaker US commitment due to an improved 
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US-China relationship or a higher external threat due to a heightened US-China hostility, 
it will boost its military buildup to avoid the risks of abandonment or entrapment. 
Abandonment is the fear that the United States may fail to come to Taiwan's aid in the 
event of war (Snyder 1984).  Entrapment is the fear that the entanglement in a dispute 
between the United States and China will turn detrimental to Taiwan's security (Snyder 
1984).  Sorokin (1994, p. 425) further argues that "if a state chooses to rely on an 
asymmetric alliance for security, it is more concerned about the risk of abandonment than 
the risk of entrapment."  It is noteworthy that states need economic support to undertake 
their military buildup (internal balancing).  That is, a higher economic growth will 
provide Taiwan the resources to carry out its military buildup or the strategy of internal 
balancing.  
         Thinking of potential costs of relying on US commitment as refracted through the 
fluctuations of US-China relations puts security, external threat and military spending 
into a meaningful context.  That is, "threat" and "security" are seen to be two sides of the 
same coin. In other words, a high degree of threat implies a low level of security while a 
lower threat is equivalent to a higher level of security.  Thus, a greater amount of security 
should, ceteris paribus, be associated with no, or only a small increase of military 
spending and a greater amount of threat should be accompanied with a greater increase in 
military outlays (Ward and Mahajan 1984, Gates and Terasawa 1992, Sorokin 1994, Cha 
2000, Danilovic 2001).      
         Summing up the theoretical expectations of Taiwan's military spending discussed 




Figure 3-1: The Theoretical Framework of Taiwan's Military Spending 
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  + 
  - 
   +
  + 
  + 
  + 
  + 
32
 
The first two variables, US-China hostility and volatility, are the two major external 
factors to be investigated in this study.  The rest of the three variables, GNP growth, 
foreign investment, and saving rate, are control variables as suggested by the previous 
studies and should be incorporated in any attempts to investigate the dynamics of 
Taiwan's military spending (Chan 1988a, 1988b, 1990; Chan and Clarke 1992a, 1992b; 
Huang 1989, 1997).  The anticipated correlations in the diagram will be specified in 
greater detail as the theoretical formulation progresses. 
         In this dissertation, I attempt to integrate external threats and internal economic 
constraints into one model, in which both US-China relations (reflecting the level of US 
commitment or external threat perception) and economic growth are the decisive factors 
affecting the dynamics of Taiwan's military spending.  Hence, I hypothesize that 
Taiwan's military expenditures increase because of an increase in either economic 
strengths or threat perceptions flowing from the bilateral interactions between the United 
States and China.  
 
 3.1 Theoretical Formulation 
         Being a "pawn" caught between China and the United States, Taiwan fears getting 
too close either with China or the United States will abridge its independence and 
identity.  On the one hand, cooperation with the United States leads to a loss of some 
degree of Taiwan's independence by becoming the US's client state.  This will lead 
Taiwan to worry about the risks of abandonment or entrapment (Rothstein 1968), and I 
argue that such worry will be reflected in the level of Taiwan's military spending over 
time.  On the other hand, reunification with China leads to loss of Taiwan's sovereignty. 
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This will increase the dangerous possibility of eventual war between both sides of the 
Taiwan Strait.  Choosing the lesser evil, Taiwan is struggling to equip itself with arms 
and alliances with the United States as the means to deter China.  Most and Siverson 
(1987) indicate that arms and alliances are substitutes for one another: either of them can 
be adopted to achieve the same goal, security (see also Sorokin 1994 p. 422).  That is, if 
Taiwan's leadership perceives US commitment as reliable, then it is assured to reduce its 
military spending.  Otherwise, Taiwan will be forced to spend more funds on military 
buildup to avoid the risk of abandonment in the event of war. 
         As far as Taiwan's security is concerned, the fluctuating US commitment has been 
both a blessing and a curse.  The United States often shuns a direct military association 
with Taiwan for fear of provoking China and overextending its commitments and 
resources.  Such a wobbly attitude makes Taiwan worry about the reliability of US 
pledges of future assistance, and its possible backsliding in wartime.  As argued above, 
the greater worry will be responded to by a higher level in Taiwan's military spending 
because of a perceived weaker US commitment leading to a higher risk of abandonment. 
In the history of Taiwan's security, only when China became a clear and present danger 
to Taiwan, would the United States then provide political, economic, and military support 
to prevent Taiwan from being merged by China.  For example, when China shelled the 
offshore islands of Taiwan in 1954, the Eisenhower administration was willing to sign the 
Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) with Taiwan, and declared that US defense of the offshore 
islands would probably lead to the use of atomic weapons (Chiu 1979, Harding 1992, 
Tucker 2001, Tow 1991).  
         In August 1958, in the second Taiwan Strait crisis, China shelled the offshore 
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islands of Taiwan to test the Soviet Union's willingness to confront American military 
power.  The United States sent six aircraft carriers laden with nuclear-capable aircraft to 
Taiwan.  Nuclear cannons were installed at Taiwan's offshore islands, and Matador 
nuclear-tipped missiles also were deployed in the key positions around the island (Tow 
1991).  However, for fear of the occurrence of a direct nuclear confrontation, these 
nuclear weapons were immediately withdrawn when China successfully developed its 
own atomic weapons in 1964.  
         In 1996, in the third Taiwan Strait crisis, China launched a series of military 
maneuvers in the waters near Taiwan.  The People Liberation Army's Second Artillery 
fired a total of six M-9 ballistic missiles pinpointed to blockade the two major harbors of 
Taiwan, Keelung and Kaohsiung. The Clinton administration responded by dispatching 
two carrier battle groups to the vicinity of Taiwan and deterred China's further military 
provocations.  "But without the forceful bipartisan pressure applied by Representatives 
Christopher Cox and Nancy Pelosi, and their colleagues, the carriers likely would not 
have been sent" (Timperlake and Triplett 1999 p. 158).  
         US commitment to Taiwan has not always been consistent, and at key junctures in 
history such as Nixon's visit to Beijing in 1972, Carter's rapprochement with China and 
abrogation of Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan in 1979, Reagan's second Shanghai 
Communiqué, and Clinton's Three-No policy in 1998, Taiwan has witnessed dramatic 
reversals of the US's China policy.  As a result of these perceived "betrayals," Taiwan is 
understandably paranoid about even the slightest change in US attitudes toward the island 
(Swaine and Mulvenon 2001).  
         Therefore, Taiwan's military spending is tied to the fears about the US commitment 
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as perceived through the level of volatility in the US-China relationship and about the 
external threat emanating from the level of hostility in the US-China dyadic interactions 
over time.  That is, a more hostile US-China relationship implies a greater external threat 
to Taiwan because of a higher risk of entrapment.  On the other hand, a higher volatile 
US-China relationship implies a greater US commitment because of lesser risk of 
abandonment.  Therefore, I argue that a high degree of US commitment or lesser degree 
of external threat would be associated with a lower level of Taiwan's military spending 
due to a more perceived level of security.  From the first Formosa Resolution Act to 
defend Taiwan and its offshore islands to the Shanghai Communiqué and subsequent de-
recognition of Taiwan, US policy toward Taiwan has been anything but consistent. 
Truman's "hand offs policy," which announced that no forces would be used to defend 
Taiwan, wanted to let Taiwan go to the communists (1948-1952) (Tucker 2001). 
Eisenhower's fear of the Soviet Union's intervention and possible confrontation with 
China resulted in his waffling on defending Taiwan's offshore islands (1953-1960) (Tow 
1992).  Nixon's visit to Beijing tried to trade off Taiwan with Vietnam (1969-1974) 
(Lasater 2000).  Carter's sudden recognition of Beijing and abrogation of the Taiwan-US 
Mutual Defense Treaty was a betrayal of a loyal friend (1977-1980) (Sheng 2001b). 
Reagan's visit to China in 1984 taught Taiwan a lesson not to cling to the past (1981-
1988) (Mann 2000).  Bush's pro-China attitude did not deny US arms-sale of 150 F-16 
warplanes to Taiwan (1989-1992).  Clinton's critiques of Bush's coddling dictatorships 
from Baghdad to Beijing did not affect his engagement policy toward China (1993-2000). 
         The lack of consistency in US policy toward the Taiwan issue is vividly described 
by Drury (2001 p. 88) who states that "the US policy toward the Strait is more like the 
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proverbial duck paddling in the water: serene on the surface but chaotic beneath."  He 
further adds, "US policy toward China and Taiwan has taken a path more like a rabbit 
escaping a predator--a series of quick shifts, sharp turns, and backtracking" (p. 97).  
         Such flip-flops in US policy toward China and Taiwan raise the question of whether 
there is any guarantee that the United States will come to Taiwan's aid in the event of 
war.  As far as Taiwan's security is concerned, ironically the arguable reliability of the 
US's commitment to defend Taiwan has thus become a more critical concern than the 
PRC's intention and capability to invade Taiwan.  Taiwan's leadership knows that with 
American military, economic, and political support, Taiwan will be able to deter attacks 
from China in the foreseeable future.  However, Taiwan can never focus too much on the 
fealty of the US's commitment to assist Taiwan in the event of future military 
confrontations with China. This fear prompts Taipei to spend an inordinate amount of 
time trying to assess the state of US-China relations, probe the relative strength of 
Washington's commitment to Taiwan, and manipulate congressional support to ensure 
continued political support and arms sales to Taiwan (Swaine and Mulvenon 2001). 
         Unlike the realist (Morgenthau 1948) point of view, Taiwan's military spending is 
not driven by the lust for power, but instead is motivated by the fears of abandonment or 
entrapment from the United States.  Taiwan's military spending, in this sense, is a 
function of its insecurity predicted by the ongoing US-China relationship.  Therefore, I 
suggest that a greater level of threat to Taiwan's security or, more specifically, a weaker 
US commitment or higher external threat, will result in a higher level of Taiwan's 
military spending. 
         As stated above, recognition of Taiwan's constant worrying about the PRC's 
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military threat and the fluctuating US commitment have constituted the underlying 
motivation and theoretical foundation of this dissertation.  In fact, international relations 
long have focused on the concept and impact of threat.  Very simply, Wolfer (1962 p. 13) 
claims that states react in fear to threats to national survival, national independence, and 
territorial integrity. 
         In most countries, security issues are viewed primarily from the perspective of 
potential external threats, and the role of the armed forces is to defend against such 
threats (Ball 1988, Bolks 1999).  "Protection against external aggression provides the 
raison d'être for all armed forces, and external security considerations are most often used 
to justify increases in military spending" (Kim 1995, p.1).  
         I contend that the external threat to Taiwan is not based solely on the total amount 
of China's military spending, but also on China's bilateral relationship with the United 
States.  That is, being a pawn in the superpower game, Taiwan is a client state, controlled 
and constrained by the ongoing US-China relationship (Chao and Myers 2000, Clough 
1999, Sheng 2001b).  
         According to Cusack and Ward (1981), threat is an important component of the 
relationship between rival nations.  They further indicate that "it is important to include 
dynamic elements of the perceived threat system in the formulation; typically, empirical 
work has ignored the dynamic aspect of the threat system" (Cusack p. 433).  Threat is a 
strong driving force boosting military spending, and it is also an underlying logic of the 
arms race literature in general.  Threat does not remain at a constant level, and the 
reaction of Taiwan to external threat does not remain static.  In this regard, the US-China 
relationship is too important to be ignored in evaluating a potential external threat, and 
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should be included in any attempt to understand the dynamics of Taiwan's military 
spending.  By focusing solely on the PRC's military spending, it is possible to overlook 
factors that have a direct bearing on the level of Taiwan's military spending.  
         In this dissertation, I argue that the US-China relationship is one important 
dimension of the external threat to Taiwan because it provides a dynamic reflection of an 
important element in the military budgeting environment.  In addition, Taiwan has good 
reasons to be paranoid about even the slightest change of US attitude toward Taiwan's 
security.   Following this logic, it may be hypothesized that the level of Taiwan's military 
spending will vary through time due to the ups and downs of US-China relations or, in 
specific, the risks of abandonment or entrapment.  
         This dissertation concentrates on military spending as an indicator of military 
security because military budget is observable and can cover the whole spectrum of 
military activities, including elements such as research and development.  In addition, 
money is the most general of all metrics providing considerable flexibility in assessing 
how specific security requirements are met through reallocation of military resources 
(Becker 1977; see also Chung 1996).  
         In contrast, it is extremely difficult to determine a nation's comparative military 
capability because the training, preparedness, and motivation, and quantity and quality of 
weapons vary by country (Lebovic and Ishaq 1987).  Furthermore, seemingly offensive 
weapons can be used for defensive purposes and qualitative and quantitative military 
advantages are mainly contingent upon the conditions under which weapons and troops 
are used (Levy 1984).  For instance, eight diesel-powered submarines recently approved 
for sale by the United States to Taiwan are treated as offensive weapons and strongly 
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opposed by the PRC, regardless of the fact that the United States and Taiwan have 
repeatedly explained they will merely be used on the defensive purposes.  This arms sale 
package is in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act, which stipulates that the United 
States will provide Taiwan with defensive weapons necessary for it to maintain a 
sufficient self-defense capability (Mann 2000 p. 95).    
 
 3.2 Hypotheses Testing 
1. US-China Hostility and Military Spending 
         Following the above discussion, three relationships (positive, negative, and 
nonexistent) between the levels of US-China hostilities and the levels of Taiwan's 
military spending are hypothesized as follows:  
 
 Hypothesis 1: The greater the level of conflict between the United States and China,  
                          the higher Taiwan's military spending will be. 
 
         This hypothesis states that a higher level of conflictual US-China relationship will 
lead to a higher level of Taiwan's military spending because of the higher perceived risk 
of entrapment.  In other words, a peaceful US-China relationship will lead to a lower 
level of Taiwan's military spending because of the lower perceived risk of entrapment. 
Thus, a better US-China relationship is not only advantageous to both China and the 
United States but also beneficial to Taiwan by leading it to decrease military spending. 
For example, when the United States shifted its diplomatic recognition from Taipei to 
Beijing in 1979, China made a number of conciliatory moves toward Taiwan.  They not 
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only halted bombardment of the offshore islands with propaganda shells and appealed to 
end the military confrontations but also proposed the establishment of direct 
communication, travel, and shipping services across the strait (Clough 1999 p. 33).  Such 
offers might lead Taiwan to feel more secure, leading it to commit less funds to its 
military as shown in the years 1979 and 1980. 
         An improved US-China relationship also might be beneficial for Taiwan's security 
because of the perceived lesser risk of entrapment from the United States.  On the other 
hand, China might be more willing to put aside the Taiwan dispute when its relationship 
with the United States is steady and good (Khalilzad 1999).  This argument is advanced 
by many American China experts, politicians, and scholars such as Madeleine Albright, 
William Cohen, Lawrence Eagleburger, Charles Freeman, Alexander Haig, Henry 
Kissinger, Anthony Lake, Kenneth Lieberthal, Winston Lord, Brent Scowcroft, David 
Shambaugh, Susan Shirk, Michael Swaine, and Michael Oksenberg (Gertz 2000).     
         A better US-China relationship also is endorsed by Beijing.  For example, Chinese 
Premier Zhu Rongji, in a speech at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, said that a 
better US-China relationship is the key to the solution of problems.  China is not a 
potential rival, nor an enemy, but a trustworthy friend of the United States.  From his 
statement, an improved US-China relationship might relegate the Taiwan dispute to the 
back burner in US-China relations.  This would provide Taiwan some breathing space in 
terms of its security, and lead it to decrease military spending in response. 
         However, other China experts, politicians, and scholars such as Kurt Campbell, 
Christopher Cox, Bob Dole, Richard Fisher, Bill Gertz, Bates Gill, Newt Gingrich, Barry 
Goldwater, Jesse Helms, Michael O'Hanlon, Nancy Pelosi, Edward Timberlake, William 
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Triplettagree and Stephan Yates, argue that the higher the level of US-China hostility will 
lead to a lower level of Taiwan's military spending.  In other words, as claimed in The 
China Threat (Gertz 2000), a conflictual US-China relationship is conducive to Taiwan's 
security because the United States would be more likely to beef up Taiwan's defense 
capabilities.  In addition, a strong US posture toward China is beneficial to Taiwan's 
security as demonstrated in the 1949, 1954, 1958, and 1996 Taiwan Strait crises. 
Campbell points out that "the common sense of helping Taiwan's defense is an easy way 
of preventing a war in the Taiwan Strait that could involve the United States" (Gertz 2000 
p. 51).  Moreover, a wobbly US commitment would lead China to misinterpret that the 
United States would be willing to reach an accommodation with them over the Taiwan 
issue and would not stomach a military defense of Taiwan if the island were attacked 
(Lasater and Yu 2000 p. 234).  Following this logic, a conflictual US-China relationship 
is presumably conducive to Taiwan because of the less need to establish its own arms. 
From this we can derive a negative correlation hypothesis, i.e., 
 
 Hypothesis 2: The greater the level of conflict between the United States and China,  
                         the lower the level Taiwan's military spending will be. 
 
         This hypothesis to a great extent justifies that "Taiwan's policy toward the United 
States is aimed to prevent Washington from improving relations with China or otherwise 
striking a deal with Beijing that might compromise Taiwan's interests" (Swaine and 
Mulvenon 2001 p. 10).  
         Finally, if the United States is, as proclaimed, simply to play a neutral or balancing 
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role between China and Taiwan, one would expect that there will be no significant impact 
of US-China relations on Taiwan's military spending because the United States, a 
hegemon, will not tilt against either side of the Taiwan Strait.  A nonexistent relationship 
can therefore be hypothesized as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Hostilities between the United States and China have no  
                        significant effects on Taiwan's military spending.  
 
         Ted Galen Carpenter (1998, 2000), a foreign policy analyst at CATO Institute 
proposes that the United States should not meddle in the Taiwan dispute.  He further 
advocates that Taiwan is of no vital interest to the United States and that American 
officials need to make it clear to both Beijing and Taipei that under no circumstances will 
the United States intervene in a PRC-Taiwanese war (see also Cohen et al. 1971, Hickey 
1999 p. 23, Lasater 2000, Sheng 2001b, Tucker 2001).  This argument makes sense if 
Taiwan is trivial to the national interest of the United States; the latter certainly will not 
take the risk of offending China for the sake of Taiwan, which may lead to a possible 
nuclear confrontation between two superpowers.   
 
2. US-China Volatility and Military Spending 
         This dissertation also investigates the extent to which historical volatility in the US-
China relationship affects Taiwan's military spending.  I hypothesize that a volatile or 
unstable US-China relationship is conducive to Taiwan's security because of a perceived 
higher US commitment or lower risk of abandonment.  Taiwan's leadership will be more 
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likely to perceive that the United States will be less likely to trade Taiwan to China when 
the US-China relationship is unstable and turns sour.  Such a perception of heightened 
security will lead to a lower level of military spending.  In order to test this theoretical 
argument, I operationalize the volatility of US-China relations and measure its impact on 
Taiwan's military spending.  Ideally, this relationship should be observed with a lag as 
described as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The higher the volatility of US-China relations, the lower  
                        Taiwan's military spending will be. 
 
         This hypothesis makes sense because the volatile relationship between the United 
States and China will open windows of opportunity for Taiwan to obtain greater political, 
economic, and military support from the United States.  In other words, the unstable US-
China relationship will motivate American willingness to develop a closer relationship 
between Taipei and Washington than would be achieved otherwise.  This would also 
explain in part why China would want to avoid hostile relations with the United States, 
because Taiwan might capitalize such opportunities to cement closer ties with the United 
States at the expense of China.  For example, the bellicose threat by Beijing's leaders in 
the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis stimulated the US Congress to vote for a new bill 
strengthening the Taiwan Relations Act and even to consider committing the United 
States to defend Taiwan (Chao and Myers 2000 p. 46).  Closer relations between Taipei 
and Washington will result in a lower level military spending by Taiwan because of a 




         However, Taiwan is very cautious not to offend China while forging closer ties with 
the United States, and will be more likely to avoid increasing military spending in the 
wake of some "triumphs" over China on the diplomatic battlefield.  There are two 
reasons.  Militarily, China could retaliate by flexing its military muscle and launch a 
disastrous assault against Taiwan.  Economically, China could sanction Taiwan by 
closing its enormous markets on which Taiwan depends for its economic livelihood 
(Boultin 1997).    
         China's renewed efforts to improve relations with the United States after the 1996 
Taiwan Strait crisis, the bombardment of the Chinese embassy, and the EP3 accident 
increased Taiwan's anxieties that China and the United States might try to pressure 
Taiwan to enter into cross-Strait talks (Swaine and Mulvenon 2001).  In other words, an 
improving and stable US-China relationship will increase Taiwan's fear of abandonment 
from the United States and result in a higher level of military spending to alleviate its fear 
due to a lower amount of security emanating from a perceived weaker US commitment to 
protect Taiwan.   
         For example, the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) by the US 
Congress in 1979 enhanced US-Taiwan relations since it redefined possible US reactions 
toward Taiwan's security crisis.  The TRA aimed to provide some semblance of the 
American security commitment to the island as enshrined in the now defunct Mutual 
Defense Treaty (Swaine and Mulvenon 2001).  To a great extent, this explains why after 
the US-China rapprochement in 1979, Taiwan did not rapidly expand its military 
spending in the following year, i.e., it wanted to avoid further provoking China. 
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         When Ronald Reagan visited Beijing in 1984 he reconfirmed that his Six 
Assurances toward Taiwan remained unchanged.  The Six Assurances clearly indicated 
that the United States had not agreed to set a date to end arms sales to Taiwan; had not 
agreed to consult the PRC government before selling weapons to the ROC; had not 
agreed to revise the TRA; would not mediate between China and Taiwan; would not alter 
its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan, and would not force Taipei to negotiate 
with Beijing (Clough 1999, Gong 2000, Harding 1992 p.116, Mann 1999).  Reagan's 
assurance of Taiwan's security explains in part why Taiwan's military spending did not 
increase after his amelioration of the US-China relationship but, on the contrary, Taiwan 
reduced its military outlays substantially in 1985.  
 
3. Economic Growth and Military Spending 
         After testing the effects of US-China relations on Taiwan's military spending as 
stated above, I next test economic effects.  Specifically, I hypothesize:  
 
Hypothesis 5: The higher Taiwan's GNP growth, the greater its military  
                        spending will be.  
 
         This hypothesis is congruent with "Rich country, strong army" that the causal arrow 
goes from economic growth to military spending--wealthier countries simply have more 
resources available to apportion (Thorn 1967, Looney 1989, Chung 1996).  Here the aim 
is to test whether the "Wealthy country, strong army" proposition is applicable to the 
Taiwanese case.  That is, I maintain that continuing material prosperity and economic 
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growth are essential to the growth of Taiwan's military spending, particularly given the 
severe external threat emanating from an evolving US-China relationship.  Economic 
growth is treated as an important factor to ensure Taiwan's national security in terms of 
financial support for military expenditures.1  
         Taiwan must contend with a range of economic and political threats, which largely 
originate from China.  Politically, the PRC is recognized as the sole legitimate 
government of China by most states, including every major power (Boutin 1997).  
Beijing considers Taiwan to be a part of China and does not renounce the use of force to 
take Taiwan back into its fold.  In economic terms, cross-Strait trade officially began in 
1987 when Taiwan lifted the ban on indirect economic interaction with China.  Since 
then, Taiwan has become increasingly dependent on Chinese markets to a degree that 
perhaps affects the survival of Taiwan's critical economic sectors (Swaine and Mulvenon 
2001).  By 1996 Taiwan's combined exports to Hong Kong and Mainland China had 
surpassed its exports to the United States.  Taiwan's government expressed worries that 
China is exerting a greater and greater influence on Taiwan's economy (Clough 1999, 
Gong 2000).  This might explain why Taiwan has to avoid offending China while 
cementing the relationship with the United States.  This might also explain why Taiwan 
will spend more on the military to alleviate a higher perceived threat or insecurity 
emanating from China. 
         For Taiwan, it is important to recognize that economic development is a 
requirement for its survival.  Particularly, Taiwan needs economic growth to support its 
tremendous military outlays.  Taiwan must take all measures to maintain a close 
economic relationship with Mainland China for its economic growth and prosperity on 
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the one hand, and to equip itself with arms from and alliances with the United States for 
its national security on the other.  That is, a stronger US commitment to Taiwan's security 
allows Taiwan more confidently to engage with China politically, economically and even 
militarily.   
 
4. Budgetary Incrementalism and Military Spending 
         Finally, according to the theory of budgetary incrementalism (Wildavski 1964; 
Russet 1970; Ostrom 1977, 1978; Moll and Luebbert 1980; Ward 1984; Kamelt and 
Mowery 1987; Harris 1988), one is able to predict that Taiwan's military spending at time 
t is a function of its immediately preceding spending at time t-1.  This might help the 
researcher to decide what will be the expected military spending in the absence of 
external shocks.  
 
Hypothesis 6: The higher Taiwan's military spending at time t-1, the greater its  
                        spending will be at time t. 
 
3.3 Model Specification 





 ∆Taiwan Military Spending t = c +d1 ∆Military Spendingt-1 +d2 US-China Hostility t  
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                                        +d3 ∆GNPt-1 +d4 Saving t+ d5 Foreign Investment Rate t +d6   
                                        ∆China's Military Spending t-1 +d7 US-China Volatilityt-1 + ε t  
      
         The dependent variable on the left-hand side of the equation is the change in 
Taiwan military spending from year t-1 to year t.  The independent variables are 
displayed on the right-hand side.  They include: change in Taiwan's military spending at 
lag time t-1, the degree of US-China hostilities in year t, Taiwan's gross national product 
(GNP) at time t-1, saving rates at time t, foreign investment as a percentage of gross 
domestic capital formation (GDCF) at time t, China's military spending at time t-1, and 
the volatility of US-China relations at time t-1 (the last four are control variables and will 
be discussed in detail in the next chapter).  The ε t is a stochastic error term assumed to be 
normally distributed.  In the model, several variables are differenced.  This is a remedy to 
make a series mean stationary and hence avoid the threat of spurious relationships 
(Granger and Newbold 1974, Hendry 1980).2 
         Stationarity is a very important characteristic for all variables in a time series 
analysis.3  If violated, it then will more likely lead to a spurious relationship, which 
would be characterized by high t and F values and R2 values but not with an appropriate 
Durbin-Watson test statistic (Engle and Granger 1987).  The inflated t-statistics will 
result in rejecting the true null hypothesis or committing a Type I error. 
         Employing an error correction mechanism, one can solve this problem.  In the error 
correction model (ECM), Taiwan's military spending in both level and difference are 
used, thus one is able to capture the relationship between differenced and level values of 
Taiwan's military spending and economic growth without any inference problems in 
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either the theoretical or methodological sense.4  In addition, using the ECM model is 
useful relative to the budgetary incremental model, which explains the dependent 
variable, based on its own history providing a little explanatory or theoretical 
contribution to the extant literature.  Thus an ECM model is tested as an alternative to the 
budgetary incremental model: 
Model 2: 
∆Taiwan Military Spending t = c +d1 ECMt-1 +d2 US-China Hostility t +d3 ∆GNPt-1  
                                +d4 Saving t+ d5 Foreign Investment Rate t +d6 ∆China's Military  
                                 Spending t-1 +d7 US-China Volatilityt-1 + ε t  
  
         The concept of an ECM is basically applicable to a situation where external shocks 
perturb an equilibrium state between two cointegrating series (Beck 1993, DeBoef and 
Granato 1995).  
         In order to know which model has a stronger explanatory power, whether the 
lagged endogenous model or the ECM model is preferable, I will estimate both models, 
compare their goodness-of-fit, and perform various diagnostic tests.  In the next chapter, I 










1. Mark Herander (1991) provides some considerations of the impact of economics in 
terms of the effects of economic growth and prosperity on national security.  He 
points out that any event that interferes with the flow of trade and so reduces a trading 
nation's economic welfare constitutes a threat to its national security. 
 
2. Spurious Relationship: when we have two separate series in a time series model with 
independent processes that are both non-stationary, yet appear to be statistically 
significant when they actually are not.  This leads the researcher to commit a Type I 
error.  Granger and Newbold suggest that if you compare the regression results 
against the Durbin-Watson d statistics and the adjusted R2 is greater than d then the 
estimated regression probably suffers from spurious regression.  Traditionally this 
problem can be remedied by differencing the data of the two series.  However, 
differencing only takes care of short-term spuriousness, but it will eliminate the long-
term relationship  (Granger and Newbold 1986).  
 
3. Stationarity: A data series is stationary if there is no systematic change in the mean 
(e.g., no trend), no systematic stochastic variation, and if strict periodic variations 
(seasonal) are stable.  Time plays no role in the sample moments (Charemza and 
Deadman 1997). 
 
4. To compare both short- and long-term relationship, we need to use the error 
correction mechanism or ECM approach as explained in the following equation: 
∆Yt  = B0 + B1∆Xt - α(Y- C1X)t-1 + Et  
1) ∆Yt and ∆Xt after first differencing are contemporaneously stationary. 
2) α(Y- C1X)t-1 is the error correction mechanism, which is a linear combination of x 
and y.  The ECM captures the long-run relationship while the differenced x and 
differenced y capture the short-term one. 
3)α represents the speed of adjustment toward equilibrium and its range lies between 





















DATA ANALYSES  
 
4.1 Data Description 
         The empirical analysis focuses on the period 1966-1992.  Later years are excluded 
because of the lack of any data on US-China interactions in Charles McClelland's (1971) 
World Events Interaction Survey (WEIS) data set.  Multiple sources of data are 
employed.  Taiwan’s Military Expenditure (T_MILEXP), and Taiwan’s Gross National 
Product figures (T_GNP) are collected from the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency (ACDA) and Taiwan’s Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD 
Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1997), respectively. 
         ACDA’s estimates are selected over other estimates because they provide military 
expenditure figures in US dollar values with reference to GNP.  Alternative sources, such 
as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), do not provide GNP 
estimates (Sun and Yu 1999).  Other independent variables such as saving rate 
(T_SAVING), foreign investment as percentage of gross domestic capital formation 
(T_FORINV), and China's military expenditures (C_MILEXP) are collected from 
Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1997 and the ACDA data set.  External threat (dyadic 
interactions) variables are taken from the extended WEIS data set, updated by Rodney 
Tomlinson at the US Naval Academy, which contains 1750 events for the China-US and 
China-Taiwan dyads during the period studied.  
         The WEIS data set is a collection of international events based on the New York 
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Times Indexes, in which data like the country(ies) triggering the event, target countries, 
date, nature of event (conflictual or cooperative) are recorded. 
         The interaction variable, US-China dyadic interactions (UC_HOSTILITY), is 
operationalized as the summation of "conflictual" scores, with intensity accounted for, 
manifested by interactive events involving the United States and China in a given year. 
The initial dyadic interaction variable is composed of 62 levels, representing events of 
different degrees of cooperation or confrontation.  They are Yield, Comment, Consult, 
Approve, Promise, Grant, Reward, Agree, Request, Propose, Reject, Accuse, Protest, 
Deny, Demand, Warn, Threaten, Demonstrate, Reduce Relations, Expel, Seize, and Use 
of Force (see Appendix I for details of 62 levels and Appendix II for recoding syntax). 
The variable UC_HOSTILITY is aggregated to provide annual data to match with 
ACDA’s variables (more explanations will be provided later). 
         Other conceivable measures of external threat include Lipow and Antinori (1995), 
who used average defense spending in the case of 75 nations.  Sezgin (1998) used 
defense spending of a rival country in his analysis of Turkey.  Karl (2000) used 
occurrence of war in his Israel study.  Oren (1995) used military capability and levels of 
hostility from the COW project to study the US-Russian case.  Kollias (1996) used a 
security dummy in the Greek-Turkish case.  Sun and Yu (1999) used a war dummy in 
China's case.  
         These empirical studies on external threats and military spending have reported 
conflicting findings, attributed to the use of cross-sectional analysis, sample variations, 
differences in specification selected, time period examined, and databases used.  Nicholas 
(1999 p. 501) suggests that "these considerations point to the justification for case-
53
 
specific studies using time series data for individual countries."  Huang (1997) also 
agrees that dynamic case studies can add more precision to our understanding and, more 
important, the cumulative knowledge derived from studying individual countries also can 
shed light on the underlying reasons of cross-national diversity.  Gastillo et al. (2001) 
further suggest using a combination of case studies and statistical methods because the 
former is good at testing a causal mechanism while the latter is best at testing the 
background conditions of a hypothesis and determining the effects of its individual 
variables.  
         After comparing different situations for different countries, I decided to follow 
Oren's (1995), and Huang, Kim and Wu's (1992) measurement of external threat by 
taking the levels of environmental hostility into account, because it allows one to take 
into account dynamic effects in the dyadic interactions, which are ignored by previous 
studies oftentimes.  In this dissertation, I use the levels of US-China hostility ranging 
from 1 to 28 as indicators to measure the degrees of external threat to Taiwan.  As argued 
before, the level of US-China hostility is the appropriate variable to capture dynamic 
exogenous effects on Taiwan's military spending.  
 
1.2 Operationalization and Measurement 
         Before discussing testing procedures, measurement and dynamics, several key 
variables will be discussed as follows: 
 
4.2-1 The Dependent Variable—(Taiwan's Annual Military Spending, 1966-1992) 
54
 
         According to the ACDA (1974), military spending is defined as current and capital 
expenditures to meet the needs of the armed forces.  However, in most of the arms race 
literature, military spending has been operationalized as a single-dimensional indicator as 
military spending (Mosley 1985).  This dissertation follows this operationalization 
because the military expenditure decision processes oftentimes vary across countries, 
making it difficult to compare them.  But total military expenditures in the form of money 
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Taiwan’s annual military spending collected from the ACDA was measured in millions 
of constant US 1993 dollars (see Figure 4-1 above).  From 1966 to 1992, Taiwan’s 
annual military spending increased upwardly from about US $ 2.637 billion to US $ 10.6 
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billion.  The first trough in Taiwan’s military spending happened in 1974 followed by a 
drastic upward trend in 1977 until the second trough appeared in 1984.  This is illustrated 
in Figure 4-1.  The third trough occurred in 1987 followed by an upward surge again in 
1989.  Another upward trend began in 1991.  
Possible explanations: Mao Tse Tung died in 1976.  This alarmed Taiwan, which worried 
about a possible diversionary attack from China.  It also suggested a possible opportunity 
for Taiwan to recover the mainland if power struggles occurred after Mao's death.  On the 
other hand, Taiwan's first political uprising, the Chungli Incident, occurred in 1977, and 
triggered a violent protest.  Angry demonstrators set fire to a police station and police 
patrol cars.  This resulted in military repression by the Kuomintang government; 
thousands of people were involved and many were injured in this political turmoil. 
Taiwan’s leadership worried that such domestic instability might prompt a surprise attack 
from China.  Therefore, Taiwan needed a military buildup to control domestic reactions 
and to deter invasions from China.       
         In October 1984, Chiang Nan, a writer with US citizenship, was murdered. 
Taiwan’s Military Intelligence Bureau was allegedly involved.  After this incident, 
Ronald Reagan, a pro-Taiwan president, applied pressure through the 1986-1987 Foreign 
Affairs Authorization Act on Taiwan's Kuomintang (KMT) regime to put 
democratization into practice.  This resulted in permitting the establishment of an 
opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (the current ruling party of Taiwan) in 
September 1986, and lifting of martial law in July 1987.1  In 1991, the Democratic 
Progressive Party won its first major victory and gained a number of seats in the 
legislative Yuan, where Taiwan’s annual military budgets are approved.  These political 
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domestic events may have affected Taiwan’s military spending as reflected in the troughs 
and peaks in Figure 4-1. 
         In terms of the US-China relationship, Washington announced normalization of 
relations with the PRC in 1978 and cut off diplomatic ties with Taiwan in 1979.  Taiwan 
recognized this diplomatic setback, especially the termination of the US-Taiwan Mutual 
Defense Treaty, as a serious threat to its security.  Therefore, it expanded its military 
expenditures.  Interestingly, however, Taiwan's military spending increased only slightly 
after the 1979 normalization.  Perhaps this was due to the enactment of the TRA by the 
US Congress in the same year to ensure Taiwan's security.  Arguably also important were 
the relatively peaceful interactions between the United States and China at that time.  
         In 1984, Ronald Reagan was reelected president, and his strong anti-communism 
stance assured Taiwan’s security.  This led to a reduction in Taiwan's military 
expenditures (see Figure 4-1).  In addition, Beijing started its economic reforms 
orchestrated by Deng Xiaoping's leadership in 1987, and thereby indicated it had no 
intention to engage in military expansion.  Meanwhile, Lee Teng-hui was inaugurated as 
president of Taiwan in 1988 and he signaled that his top priority was to improve 
economic ties with China.  Taiwan's investment in China increased when Taiwan and 
China began to soften their hostilities toward each other in 1987.  In the same year, 
Taiwan not only nullified martial law but also granted permission for Taiwan citizens to 
visit relatives in China.  In 1991, Lee announced that Taiwan's government would 
renounce the use of military force for the pursuit of national unification.  Both sides of 
the Taiwan Strait further established semi-official organizations authorized to negotiate 
with each other to resolve problems arising in people-to-people relations across the strait. 
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These were the Strait Exchange Foundation on the Taiwan side and the Association for 
Relations Across the Taiwan Strait in China (Clough 1999, Chao and Myers 2000, 
Harding 1992, Sheng 2001, Tucker 2001).  To account for these several political events, 
dummy variables for the years 1977, 1984, 1987 and 1991 are included as controls in the 
models of Taiwan’s military spending. 
 
4.2-2 Other Independent Variables 
1. Index of US-China Conflict 
         The first continuous independent variable, the index of US-China conflict, is 
operationalized as the sum of the conflictual scores from Reject (11) to Force (22) events 
manifested by the dyadic interactions between China and the United States from 1966 to 
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         According to Goldstein (1992), McClelland's WEIS data set should not aggregate 
all events into a single conflict-cooperation time series.  He further points out that WEIS 
is constructed within a conceptual framework that explicitly denies the possibility of 
reducing data to one dimension of the conflict-cooperation spectrum.  Huang, Kim and 
Wu (1992 p. 50) measured the frequency of conflicts between China and the United 
States by reling on Edward Azar's Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) from 1948 
to 1978.  The COPDAB data set contains a variable (called the conflict scale category) 
which records each event according to the degree of conflict or cooperation involved on a 
15-point ordinal scale--the lower the score, the higher the degree of cooperation and vice 
versa, a score of 8 representing a neutral act.  However in the final statistical analysis, 
they only counted those conflicts in categories 11 (hostile diplomatic-economic actions) 
to 15 (full-scale air, naval, or land battles).  
         When I converted WEIS data into a conflict-cooperation continuum, I found that 
the relatively rare frequencies of conflictual events were obliterated by most of the 
cooperative events, thus no significant variations could possibly be captured.  Therefore, 
I explored the possibility of re-coding the scales by simply counting the number of 
conflictual events started from Reject (11), which is the eleventh category in the WEIS 
data set (see Appendix I), and its two subcategories 111 and 112 are coded as value 1 and 
2 separately.  Following throughout this procedure, I coded the last category Force (22) 
and its three subcategories 221, 222, and 223 as values 26, 27 and 28 (see Appendix II). 
After these data transformations, US-China hostility becomes an ordinal variable, which 
ranges from 1, the least conflictual score, to 28, the most conflictual score.  Larger values 
represent higher levels of conflict or hostility between China and the United States.  The 
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lowest raw score of hostility, 1, reflects the occurrence of actions such as turn down 
proposal; reject protest, demand, or threat between the United States and China (detailed 
in appendix I), and the highest raw score of hostility, 28, reflects military engagement as 
at the subcategory 223 (see appendix I).  The hostility scores are aggregated by each year 
as shown in Figure 4-2.  Taking the total accumulated scores for each year allows one to 
detect the impact of accumulated intensity of US-China hostility on Taiwan's military 
spending on an annual basis. 
         As shown in Figure 4-2, after Nixon's visit to China in 1972, US-China relations 
improved rapidly until the inauguration of Ronald Reagan in 1980.  The strong anti-
Communist characteristics of the Reagan administration increased tension between the 
two countries, and levels of hostility increased rapidly in the three years from 1981 to 
1983.  However, in Reagan's second term his administration seemed to moderate its 
hostile attitude toward China.  The amelioration of US-China relations continued until the 
occurrence of the Tiananmen massacre in 1989 (see Figure 4-2).  
 
2.Taiwan's Annual Economic Gross National Product 
         Gross National Product (GNP) is an economic measure much like Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP).  GNP is the total market value of all final goods and services produced 
annually by citizens of a country (Arnold 1998).  Unlike GDP, GNP measures the 
production of goods and services by the citizens of a country, no matter where in the 
world they reside (Arnold 1998).  It is widely used as the basic measure of the 
performance of the economy in producing goods and services.  As noted above, GNP is a 
relevant factor because it is related to national income, which delineates the overall 
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         The data on Taiwan GNP in 1993 constant New Taiwan (NT) dollars, per million 
units (see Figure 4-3), are taken from the 1997 Taiwan Statistical Data Book.   In the 
1960s, Taiwan made a transition from import-substituting industrialization (ISI) to 
export-oriented industrialization (EOI), whereupon a high degree of economic growth 
was achieved over time as shown by the upward trend in Figure 4-3 (Copper 1999, 
Ferdinand 1996, Fields 1995).  Keeping pace with economic growth, the exchange rate of 
the New Taiwan dollar to the US dollar also rose.  Taiwan's foreign currency reserve 
increased rapidly in the last half of the 1980s, reaching around 80 billion US dollars in 
1987, and became the third largest in the world, following Japan and Germany.  Taiwan 
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was recognized as a "nation of wealth."  Afterwards, GNP kept increasing, and Taiwan 
has achieved a position as the highest foreign reserve country in the world after July 1992 
(Chan and Clarke 1992, Copper 1999, Ferdinand 1996, Fields 1995, see also Taiwan's 
400 Year History).  
         Chan and Clarke (1992) summarize the factors leading to Taiwan's economic 
growth.  These include the legacy of Japanese colonialism, the Cold War ideology of the 
United States, and the global economic cycle at the time of its initial export drive. 
However, consciousness of the PRC threat and its effects should not be overlooked (Chan 
1990).  As stated above, Taiwan's economic growth and industrialization should enhance 
its military power, with the aim of increasing national strength to promote security and 
peace.  
 
3. Error Correction Mechanism 
         The ECM, a linear combination of Taiwan's military spending and Gross National 
Product, is a stationary variable, which is measured as the residuals of the cointegrating 
regression of T_MILEXP and T_GNP.  In the statistical model, the ECM operates with a 
lag of 1 period, and it captures the long-term relationship between T_MILEXP and 
T_GNP (see Figure 4-4 in the back).  
         In keeping with the idea that T_MILEXP and T_GNP are in dynamic equilibrium 
(i.e., they move together in the long-run), it is expected that ECM's coefficient, β1, will 
carry a negative sign, and be greater than 0 and less than 1 in magnitude.  The 
relationship is shown in the following equation: ∆ (T_MILEXP) = β0 + β1 ECMt-1 + ut  .  
where ∆ = difference operator (i.e. T_GNPt - T_GNPt-1) 
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          β0 = constant 
          β1 = regression coefficient 
     ECM = error correction mechanism, T_MILEXPt - C0 - C1T_GNPt, where C0  
                 and C1 are estimated by the cointegrating regression in T_MILEXPt =  
                  C0 + C1T_GNPt . 
            ε t  = error term 
The negative sign of β1 implies that shocks to T_MILEXP at time t will be adjusted or 
"re-equilibrated" in subsequent periods by the cointegrating relationship between 
Taiwan's military spending and GNP.  The adjustment rate is determined by the 
magnitude of β1.  For example, if β1 = -.5, this means that 50% of a shock (from whatever 
source) to T_MILEXP at time t will be eroded at time t+1.  In other words, fifty percent 
of what remains of the shock at t+1 will be eroded at t+2 and so on into the future.  For 
example, if the total shock at time t is .8 then it will erode 50 % of .8 at time t+1, that is 
.4.  Following through the procedure, it will become .2 at time t+2 and .1 at time t+3 and 
so on until it re-equilibrates to the original level.  If the error process, ε t, meets standard 
(Gauss-Markov) assumptions, the parameters in the above equation may be estimated 
using OLS regression (Clarke, Norpoth, and Whiteley 1998).  
 
4. Taiwan's Annual Foreign Investment as Percentage of GDCF  
         Foreign investment is seen by many as a prerequisite for economic growth and an 
amount of 10% of GNP has been suggested as a threshold necessary for economic takeoff  
(Rostow 1960).  In this dissertation, foreign investment is measured in annual percentage 
terms based on Taiwan's Statistical Data Book 1997  i.e., the total amount of foreign 
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investment divided by the total amount of Taiwan's Gross Domestic Capital Formation 
(GDCF) times 100 (see Figure 4-5).   
         According to Taiwan's Statistical Data Book, the United States, Japan, Hong Kong, 
and overseas Chinese communities have been the most important sources of imported 
capital, as each of these sources provided between 18% and 28% of cumulative foreign 
investment in Taiwan over the postwar period (Huang 1989; Chan and Clarke 1992). 
However, as argued above, there seems to exist a psychological linkage between the 
perceived "riskiness" of a state and foreign investment.  This might explain in part the 
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         Chan and Clarke (1992) note that Taiwan's foreign investment peaked at just under 
10% of Gross Domestic Capital Formation (GDCF) from 1968 to 1971, and then fell 
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substantially (to about 3%) during the 1970s and the early 1980s, before climbing again 
(to about 7%) in the late 1980s.  A possible explanation for the rapid drop in foreign 
investment from 1972 to 1979 might be that Nixon's visit to Beijing in 1972 symbolized 
the change of US foreign policy toward China.  This caused international investors to 
worry about the security of Taiwan and to hesitate to invest in Taiwan.  The international 
economic recession caused by oil crises in 1973 and 1979 also might help to explain the 
huge decrease in foreign investment during this period. 
 
5. Taiwan's Annual Saving Rate 
         Economic development requires investment and savings.  Capital formulation 
increases labor productivity and economic growth.  To accumulate capital, it is necessary 
to save (Parkin 1998).  Taiwan's saving rates, even at the lowest troughs, are high, 
exceeding 10% (see Figure 4-6).  This provides a clue not only to its economic miracle 
but also to its high military spending.  Smith (1977) notes, wealthier states should have a 
greater need and incentive for maintaining demand because they will be driven by 
increasing domestic needs to seek more natural resources from abroad.  A wealthy 
country also simply has more financial support and material power to deal with external 
threats than otherwise would be the case.  Therefore, states with higher saving rates are 
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         The calculation and data of average propensity to save are collected from Taiwan's 
Statistical Data Book 1997 as follows: 
         Saving Propensity Score    =                (Household Savings)  
 
                                                            (Household Disposable Income) 
 
         As shown in Figure 4-6, the saving rate quickly escalated from about 12% in the 
1960s to over 24% at the beginning of the 1970s where it has remained except in 1975 
and 1981.  During the 1980s, Taiwan's saving rate increased to around 30% until falling 
in 1989, probably due to the impact of the Tiananmen incident.  The heightened tensions 
between China and the United States due to China's brutal suppression of students' 
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democratic demonstration seemed to affect economic activities throughout the region.  It 
is plausible that the economic downturn at that time is one of the major reasons for the 
drastic decline in the Taiwanese saving rate.   
         Myers (1984) suggests that Taiwan's remarkable saving rate results from a variety 
of factors such as the popularity of opening small businesses, a culture that encourages 
industrious work and saving, and policy incentives regarding tax and interest rates.  
However, the external threat should not be ignored as an influence on the individual's 
willingness to save.  It may be conjectured that when people feel insecure, they will more 
likely save money in the event of an emergency instead of spending their money without 
any other resources as security.  Kim (1995) further points out that war cramps luxury 
spending.  He adds that, historically, people have spent less money during time of war 
because they are nervous about what the future may bring.  Thus, they control their 
spending more closely.  
 
6. Volatility in the US-China Conflict Index 
         To analyze the nature of the US-China relationship and its impact on Taiwan’s 
military spending, this study also employs a volatility variable, which measures 
fluctuations in the extent of conflict in US-China relations.  Specifically, the variable is 
the variance of the sum of conflict scores in each year (see Figure 4-7).  Figure 4-8 
further illustrates the annual mean US-China conflict scores from 1966 to 1992 and the 
frequencies for each year.  Using these mean scores, I calculate standard deviations and 
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The formula for the volatility calculation is: 
                                         n 
                         s = (1/n-1∑(m-xi)2)1/2 
                                         i=1     
         Where: s = standard deviation, or historical volatility 
                      n = number of occurrences (bars) 
                     m = mean scores of US-China hostility 
                     xi = hostility score changes 
         For any given year, a larger variance indicates a more volatile or unstable US-China 
relationship.  As shown in Figure 4-8, the normalization of US-China relationship in 
1979 was in actuality very unstable because of its large standard deviation of US-China 
conflict scores.  A possible explanation is that the US enactment of the Taiwan Relations 
Act in the same year resulted in a number of protests by China.  This, in turn, explains the 
reason why a large standard deviation occurred, and reveals the conflictual nature of US 
policy toward China and Taiwan.  
         In contrast, Reagan signed the second Shanghai Communiqué in 1982, which 
enjoined the United States to restrict arms sales to Taiwan so long as the balance of 
military power between China and Taiwan is preserved.  However, in his visit to China in 
1984, Reagan stated that Washington would not pressure Taiwan’s government to 
negotiate with China or to serve as an intermediary between the two governments, and 
would ensure that Taiwan had the weaponry needed to defend itself (Chao and Myers 
2000, Clough 1999, Gong 2000, Harding 1992, Lasater and Yu 2000, Mann 2000, Sheng 
2001b).  These conflictual gestures to great extent explain the large mean US-China 
conflict scores in the years 1984 and 1985. 
         The Tiananmen incident was the main factor prompting the surge in mean US-
69
 
China conflict scores in 1989.  Although the Bush administration was criticized for 
cuddling the Beijing dictatorship, China’s brutal suppression of student demonstrations 
was an explosive factor that led Washington to adopt a series of economic sanctions and 
indirectly led to the sale of F16 warplanes to Taiwan in 1992.  
 
7. China's Annual Military Spending 
         Similar to Taiwan’s military spending, China’s military spending data also are 
collected in the ACDA data set.  Waller (1997) indicates that the official Chinese defense 
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         For example, revenue raised and spent independently by PLA’s industry (e.g., 
proceeds derived from arms sales) is not counted (Waller 1997).  Similarly, Sun and Yu 
(1999) argue that it is not convincing to study China’s military spending based on the 
official Chinese data because a significant portion of this spending is excluded from the 
defense budget and funded under other headings. 
         Here, China’s annual military spending data are calculated in constant 1993 US 
dollars (see Figure 4-9).  As this figure illustrates, there was a huge spike in China’s 
military spending in 1979, which then rapidly declined.  A possible explanation of this 
sudden increase might be the occurrence of the border war between Vietnam and China 
in 1979.  After the war, the Chinese leaders revised their policies and assigned top 
priority to economic development (Sun and Yu 1997).  The rapprochement between 
China and the United States allowed Beijing to lessen its military spending burden.  The 
reduction lasted until 1988 (see Figure 4-9).  The Tiananmen event in 1989 increased the 
PRC leadership’s sense of insecurity, as reflected in the small increase in military 
spending in the 1990s. 
 
4.3 Stationarity Tests 
         As noted above, stationarity is a very important property of time series data because 
assuming time series are stationary when, in fact, they are non-stationary can produce 
very misleading results (Durr 1993, Ostrom and Smith 1993, Williams 1993, Box-
Steffensmeier and Smith 1996).  The situation where both the dependent variable and the 
independent variables are non-stationary invites "spurious regressions."  Regression 
coefficients can appear to be statistically significant even when, in fact, the variables 
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being analyzed are totally unrelated (Granger and Newbold, 1986).  So before conducting 
any meaningful statistical analysis, one needs to check the stationarity of each series of 
interest.  For this purpose, Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests are used.2  The results are as 
follows: 
1. Taiwan's annual military spending (T_MILEXP) is a non-stationary time series as 
demonstrated by the outcome from the ADF test as shown in Table 4-1.  A first 
difference renders the series, ∆(T_MILEXP), stationary because the ADF test statistic –
5.468 exceeds the critical value –4.37 at the .01 level, thereby leading one to reject the 
null hypothesis of non-stationarity. 
 2. US-China Conflict Levels (UC_HOSTILITY) is a stationary time series as 
demonstrated in the Dickey-Fuller Test in Table 4-2.  The ADF test statistic –3.546 is 
less than the critical value –2.985 at the .05 level, thus rejecting the null hypothesis that 
UC_HOSTILITY is non-stationary.  Thus, UC_HOSTILITY will be incorporated in the 
model in level form to investigate its impact on Taiwan's military spending. 
3. Taiwan’s annual GNP growth is a non-stationary time series as demonstrated by the 
ADF test in Table 4-3.  As noted, Taiwan’s annual GNP growth trended upward from 
1966 until 1992, the last year in the study (see Figure 4-3).  However, the graphical 
analysis only provides an auxiliary measure to identify the stationarity of the series.  To 
further confirm the non-stationarity of the T_GNP, we need to go further to conduct the 
ADF test.  The ADF test statistic, –3.85, is less than the critical value –3.60, thus 
rejecting the null hypothesis of non-stationarity.        
     Figure 4-10 shows both T_MILEXP and T_GNP are non-stationary but trending 
together; therefore, one needs to determine if these two series cointegrate, i.e., to test if 
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For this purpose, I employ a Johansen test (Kenndy 1992, Harris 1995, Charemza and 
Deadman 1997).  The result of testing of the two series for cointegration is congruent 
with the graph and theory indicating that they are cointegrated.  The first row in the upper 
Jonhansen test (see Table 4-5, Appendix) examines the hypothesis of no cointegration, 
i.e., that is, the T_MILEXP and T_GNP have no attractor that keeps them in proportion 
to each other in the long-run.  As shown in Table 4-5 the hypothesis is strongly rejected 
in favor of cointegration, which further justifies the application of the error correction 
model (ECM) in this dissertation.  
4. The Error Correction Mechanism of GNP and Military Spending is stationary as 
registered in Table 4-6 (see Appendix).  The ADF test statistic –2.73 is less than –2.63 at 
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the level of 0.1 and thus it is a weak stationary series and will be tested at its level form in 
regression analysis. 
5.Taiwan’s Annual Foreign investment as percentage of GDCF (T_ FORINV) is a non-
stationary time series as shown in Table 4-7.  After first differencing, the ∆(T_FORINV) 
became strongly stationary and the ADF test statistic –6.05 is far less than –3.73 at the 
level of .01.  Thus, this series will be incorporated in the general equation as a first 
differenced form. 
6. Taiwan’s Annual Saving Propensity Rate is a non-stationary series too (see Table 4-8). 
Similar to Taiwan’s foreign investment, the T_SAVING needs first differencing to render 
it stationary.  For the differenced ∆(T_SAVING), the ADF test statistic is –4.61.  This is 
less than the critical value –3.72 at the .01 level.  Thus, it will be incorporated into the 
equation in first difference form. 
7. The US-China Mean Scores for Volatility (UC_VARIANCE) is stationary as shown in 
Table 4-9.  The ADF test statistic –2.75 is lower than the critical value –2.63 at the level 
of .01.  This indicates that it can be incorporated in the model based in level form. 
8. China’s Annual Military Spending is nonstationary as shown in Table 4-10.  It needs to 
be first differenced before it can be incorporated in the model. 
         Having checked the stationarity of all series of interest, I can now test the 
hypotheses that guided the specification of the model of Taiwan's military spending.  








1. See Taiwan's 400 Year History published on website http://members.home.net   
    /wchen88/chronology.htm 
 
2. I employed the Dickey-Fuller test where the null hypothesis is that a series has a unit-  
     root.  For example, let Taiwan's military spending, T_MILEXP =α(T_MILEXP)t-1+et  
     then the unit-root test is to identify whether the absolute value of α is equal to or less  
     than 1. If lαl < 1 then T_MILEXP is stationary, but if lαl = 1 then T_MILEXP is  
     nonstationary.  Thus formal tests of stationarity are tests for α = 1, and because of this  
     are referred to as tests for a unit root.  The case of lαl > 1 is ruled out as being  
     unreasonable because it would cause the series T_MILEXP to explode (Kennedy  
    1992).  Rejection of the null hypothesis implies that T_MILEXP is stationary.  
              It should be noted that although the Dickey-Fuller test statistic is a simple t-ratio,  
     its critical values for the test are non-standard, and vary depending upon whether one  
     includes a constant or deterministic trend in the regression analysis that generates the  
     unit-root test statistic (Kennedy 1992).  The software package, EView, employed in  
     this dissertation, will automate the unit-root testing procedure, providing menus of  
     tests and test options, and displaying critical values at given probability values.    
              If the unit-root tests suggest that two or more series are non-stationary, the next  
     step is to determine if they cointegrate.  A suitable procedure to test if Taiwan’s  
     military spending and Taiwan’s GNP cointegrated is to regress one series on the other.  
     The regression is T_MILEXP = C0 + C1 T_GNP.  If both series are cointegrate, it is  
     expected that this regression will have a large R2 and the estimated coefficient C1 will  
     be statistically significant and properly signed (Engle and Granger 1987).  For the next  
     step, I need to perform a unit-root test on the residuals of the regression (a linear  
     combination of T_MILEXP and T_GNP) to determine if they constitute a stationary  
     series. 
 
3. However, there may be a possible simultaneity problem existing between military  
    spending and GNP growth as suggested by theory.  I thus employed a Granger  
    Causality Test to identify which arrow direction derives better predictive power:  
    Whether GNP growth drives the increases in military spending or vice versa?  
             According to the outcomes of the Granger Causality Test in Table 4-4, Taiwan’s  
    GNP growth evidently Granger causes Taiwan’s military spending.  The T_GNP does  
    not Granger cause T_MILEXP statistically significant at level .001 thus the null  
    hypothesis is strongly rejected.  On the other hand, T_MILEXP has little predictive  
    power for T_GNP and the hypothesis of no Granger causality is easily accepted.  This  
    finding is interesting because it is contrary to most previous findings, which  
    maintain that Taiwan’s high military spending leads to its rapid economic growth  
    instead of the other way around as suggested by this study. 







METHODS AND RESULTS 
5.1 Basic Concepts 
         This chapter first reviews some basic methodological concepts applied in the 
statistical analysis of the theoretical model of Taiwan’s military spending.  Model 
parameters are estimated using OLS regression procedures.  The OLS assumptions are 
very important to ensure unbiasedness, efficiency, and consistency crucial for making 
useful statistical inferences.1  The OLS assumptions (Gujarati 1978) are: 
1. Zero Mean: E(et) = 0, for all t which implies that µe = 0. 
2. Constant Variance: Var(et) = δe2 , for all t. 
3. No Autocorrelation: E(etev) = 0, for t ≠ v which implies that cov etev = 0.  
4. Nonstochastic Regressors: E(etxt)= 0, for all et and xt. 
5. Linearity: the relationship between Y and X is linear. 
6. Normality: the error term is normally distributed. 
         The variables studied in this dissertation are all time series data that are typical 
examples of longitudinal observations.  Longitudinal observations may be integrated, 
thus being no longer stationary.  From the graphical analyses, Taiwan's annual military 
spending and GNP likely are nonstationary series due to their upward trending features as 
illustrated in Figure 4-10.  The testing results of ADF tests in Chapter Four further 
verified both series are nonstationary.  
         Box and Jenkins (1976) demonstrate that if a series is characterized by a stochastic 
trend, then differencing it will render it stationary.  However, there is a price to pay for 
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differencing variables, namely any long-run relationships between them are obliterated 
(Beck 1992).  It seems that we are in a dilemma caught between the methodological 
"Scylla" of spurious regression and the theoretical "Charybdis" of ignoring long-term 
relationships (Clarke and Whiteley 1998).  Engle and Granger (1987) prove that it is 
possible to analyze nonstationary series that are cointegrated by using an error correction 
model specification (ECM).  Simply stated, cointegrated series are in a state of dynamic 
equilibrium such that they travel together in the long-run (Clarke and Whiteley 1998).  
         Thus, if Taiwan's military spending and Taiwan's GNP series are in equilibrium 
while growing over time, they will not drift apart or significantly diverge from each other 
in the long-run.  Cointegrating series have the property that a linear combination of them 
is a stationary variable.  It is important to emphasize that cointegration cannot be 
assumed or inferred from a graphical analysis alone, but must be demonstrated 
empirically through formal diagnostic tests such as the Johansen test as exhibited in 
Table 4-5 in the Appendix.  If one concludes that nonstationary series cointegrate, then an 
ECM specification is warranted (Clarke and Whiteley 1998). 
 
5.2 Testing Procedures for ECM 
         Following the procedures, I conclude that both T_MILEXP and T_GNP series are 
nonstationary and cointegrate.  Thus, it is appropriate to model them in error correction 
form.  This allows me to study both short- and long-term relationships between the 
variables as shown in the following equation: 
∆T_MILEXPt  = B0 + B1∆T_GNPt - α(T_MILEXP- C1T_GNP)t-1 + Et  
1) ∆T_MILEXPt and ∆T_GNPt are stationary variables. 
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2) α(T_MILEXP- C1T_GNP)t-1 is the error correction mechanism (ECM), which is a 
stationary linear combination of Taiwan’s GNP and military spending.  The ECM 
operates with a lag of 1 period, and it captures the long-term relationship between both 
the dependent variable and the independent variable while ∆T_GNP captures the short-
term relationship. 
3) As described above, α must carry a negative sign implying that shocks to T_MILEXP 
will be adjusted or re-equilibrated in subsequent periods by the cointegrating relationship 
between T_GNP and T_MILEXP.  The adjustment rate is determined by the magnitude 
of α, which ranges between negative 1 and 0. 
 
5.3 Diagnostic Tests 
         A series of diagnostic tests were conducted to determine whether the models of 
interest are consistent with the basic assumptions of OLS.  OLS procedures in EViews 
provide the following test statistics.         
1. The t-statistic, the ratio of coefficient to its standard error, is a test statistic for the 
hypothesis that a coefficient has a particular value.  If the t-statistic exceeds 2 in 
magnitude it is at least 95 percent probable that the coefficient is not zero (Gujarati 
1978).  Normally, probabilities lower than .05 are taken as strong evidence of rejection of 
the null hypothesis. 
2. The R2 or adjusted R2 measures the success of the regression in predicting the values of 
the dependent variable within the sample.  R2 is the percentage of the variance of the 
dependent variable explained by the independent variables ranging between positive one 




 3. The Durbin-Watson statistic is a test statistic for first-order autocorrelation.  If it is 
less than 2 and close to 0, there is evidence of positive autocorrelation, and if it is greater 
than 2 and close to 4, there is evidence of negative autocorrelation.  When a lagged 
endogenous variable is incorporated, then the Durbin h test and the Ljung-Box Q are 
superior to the Durbin-Watson test (Doti and Adibi 1998; Kennedy 1993; Gujarati 1978; 
see also EViews User's Guide 1995). 
4. The Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test is an alternative to the Ljung-Box Q 
for testing autocorrelation.  The test belongs to the class of asymptotic tests known as 
Lagrange multiplier (LM) tests.  Unlike the Durbin-Watson statistic for first-order 
autocorrelation or AR(1) errors, the LM test may be used to test for higher order ARMA 
processes, and is applicable regardless of whether there are lagged dependent variables.     
The null hypothesis of the LM test is that there is no serial correlation up to lag order p, 
where p is a pre-specified integer (Harvey 1990, Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1991).  
         Autocorrelation is a very important issue that has to be dealt with in time series 
analysis.  Autocorrelation means that the succeeding observations in the data depend on 
each other.  This means that there is less information in the data than what one thought, 
since the current values of the time series depend in some way on past ones.  If present, 
autocorrelation will suppress the standard error and inflate t-ratios, which in turn will 
prompt one to commit Type I errors, i.e., rejection of true hypotheses. 
5. The Standard Error of the Regression is a summary measure of the size of the 
prediction errors.  It has the same units as the dependent variable and is a measure of the 
magnitude of the residuals (for details see Greene 1990, Gujarati 1978, Kennedy 1993, 
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Kmenta 1997).  
6. A collinearity test such as the Pearson correlation matrix helps to identify whether the 
measured variables are too highly intercorrelated to allow precise analysis of their 
individual effects (Greene 1990).  The existence of collinearity will inflate the standard 
errors and result in suppression of t-statistics, therefore inviting Type II errors, i.e., a 
failure to reject the false hypothesis. 
7. The Jarque-Bera Test tests whether the series is normally distributed.  The test statistic 
measures the difference of the skewness and kurtosis of the series with those from the 
normal distribution (Gujarati 1978).  Under the null hypothesis of a normal distribution, 
the Jarque-Bera statistic is distributed according to the degrees of freedom.  The reported 
probability is the probability that a Jarque-Bera statistic exceeds (in absolute value) the 
observed value under the null—a small probability value such as less than .05 leads to the 
rejection of the null hypothesis of a normal distribution (Kennedy 1993; Doti and Adibi 
1998).  
         The normality of sampling distribution allows the time series analysis to obtain 
asymptotic properties and convergence in distribution (Gujarati 1978).  The former helps 
us to find our estimators that eventually concentrate around the true value of the 
parameter as the sample size increases.  The latter is the criteria for the classical linear 
regression model with fixed regressors and normally independently and identically 
distributed (i.i.d.) errors are distributed normally for any sample size T.  This allows one 
to conduct hypothesis tests over the t and F distributions.  The violation of normality will 




8. The Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedastic  (ARCH) test is employed in this 
dissertation to identify and estimate conditionally heteroskedastic series (Engle 1982, 
Harvey 1990, Enders 1996).  Heteroskedasticity in the error term, just like 
autocorrelation, invalidates the conventional standard error formulas and the associated 
inference procedure as the Type I error described above.  
         The use of the ARCH test for heteroskedasticity is motivated by the observation 
that in working with military spending and GNP series, as illustrated in Figure 4-10, the 
size of residuals appeared to be related to the size of recent residuals.  The test is based 
on the regression of squared residuals on lagged, squared residuals.  The output from this 
test is an F-statistic, and a T (sample size)*R2 statistic, which is distributed as a chi-
square with degrees of freedom equal to the number of lags (Kennedy 1993).  The 
violation of heteroskedasticity will result in an inefficient but unbiased estimate. 
9. White's Heteroskedasticity test is employed to examine whether the error variance is 
affected by any of the regressors, their squares or their crossproducts (Harvey 1990, 
Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1991).  This test is based on the augmented regression and its 
output is an F-statistic and an asymptotic chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom 
equal to the number of independent variables on the right-hand side.  The statistic 
provides a test of the hypothesis that the coefficients of the variables in the augmented 
regression are all zero (Doti and Adibi 1998).  
         The White test is also a general test for model misspecification, since the null 
hypothesis underlying the test assumes that the errors are both homoskedastic and 
independent of the regressors and that the linear specification of the model is correct. 
Failure of any one or more of these conditions could lead to a significant test statistic. 
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Conversely, a nonsignificant test statistic would be very reassuring since it implies that 
none of the three conditions described above is violated (EViews User's Guide p. 224). 
10. Ramsey's RESET Test is an omnibus test for autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and 
non-normal disturbances.  It helps one to identify specification errors such as 1) omitted 
variables, i.e., the right-hand side variables do not include all relevant variables; 2) 
incorrect functional form, for instance, some or all of the variables in Y and X should be 
transformed to logs, powers, reciprocals or in some other way; 3) correlation between 
independent variable and the error term, which may be caused by such things as 
measurement error in the independent variable, simultaneity, incorporation of lagged 
endogenous variable and autocorrelation (Eviews User's Guide pp. 228-229).  The 
Ramsey RESET Test is applicable only to an equation estimated with least squares, and a 
violation of specification assumptions will lead to an asymptotically biased and 
inconsistent OLS estimator, which will invalidate the conventional inference procedures 
(Eviews User's Guide). 
         The statistical analyses in this dissertation will employ these testing procedures.  
 
5.4 Results and Discussion 
1. Discussing the Statistical Results 
         Preliminary statistical analyses (see Table 5-2 on the next page) pertaining to the 
two competing models posited in this dissertation suggest that the error correction model 
(ECM) fares better than the budgetary incremental model (BIM).  A battery of diagnostic 
tests such as standard error of regression, Akaike's criteria (AIC), Durbin-Watson 
statistic, and adjusted R2 suggests the ECM is superior to the BIM.  In addition, the ECM 
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not only is able to capture the short-run effects of GNP but also the long-run ones, which 
are ignored in the BIM.  Therefore, the following discussion will focus mainly on the 
empirical evidence provided by the error correction model (ECM) as demonstrated in 
Table 5-1. 
Table 5-1 ECM Estimates on Taiwan’s Military Spending, 1966-1992 
Dependent Variable: D(T_MILEXP) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 12/06/01   Time: 09:46 
Sample(adjusted): 1968 1992 
Included observations: 25 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
∆Taiwan's GNP(-1) 0.003074 0.000383 8.032618 0.0000 
ECM(-1) -0.293872 0.097832 -3.003843 0.0095 
Index of US-China Hostility 1.463099 0.668489 2.188667 0.0461 
∆Taiwan's Saving 4081.057 1487.720 2.743162 0.0159 
∆Taiwan's Foreign Investment  93.10624 26.84120 3.468781 0.0038 
YR1977 500.1026 241.2861 2.072654 0.0571 
YR1984 -769.7153 259.4940 -2.966217 0.0102 
YR1987 -2255.457 277.7492 -8.120484 0.0000 
YR1991 -665.9224 256.9485 -2.591657 0.0213 
Volatility in US-China Conflict Index (-1) -8.371837 3.773091 -2.218827 0.0435 
C -53.63775 136.8916 -0.391827 0.7011 
R-squared 0.942112     Mean dependent var 319.9200 
Adjusted R-squared 0.900764     S.D. dependent var 687.9171 
S.E. of regression 216.7057     Akaike info criterion 13.89514 
Sum squared resid 657459.0     Schwarz criterion 14.43144 
Log likelihood -162.6892     F-statistic 22.78482 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.903713     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000001 
 
 
         As shown in the table, all independent variables except China’s annual military 
spending are statistically significant with appropriate signs.  The adjusted R2 indicates 




Table 5-2 A Summary Test Report  
Variables ECM BIM 
∆Taiwan’s GNP t-1  0.003*** 0.0028*** 
ECMt-1 -0.29**  
∆Taiwan’s Military Spendingt-1  -0.16 
Index of US-China Conflict 1.46* 1.69* 
∆Saving Propensity Rate 4018.1* 3866.6* 
∆Foreign Investment as % of GDCF 93.1** 100.5** 
YR1977 500.1* 641.9* 
YR1984 -2255.5* -1095.9** 
YR1987 -769.7*** -2726.7** 
YR1991 -665.9* -538.3 
Volatility in US-China Conflict Index -8.37* -2.02 
   
   
S.E. of regression 216.7 242.6 
AIC 13.895 14.1 
D-W statistic 1.903 1.97 
Adjusted R2 0.901 0.87 
                                                                          
Significance level * at 0.05     **at 0,01  
 
    *** at 0.001 
 
         The findings shown in Table 5-2 strongly suggest the following points: first and 
foremost, the dyadic interactions show that the US-China hostility has a statistically 
significant impact (p<.05) on Taiwan’s defense spending.  Not China’s military outlays 
but the level of hostility between the United States and China is the major external factor 
affecting Taiwan’s military expenditures.  In other words, the US-China hostility has a 
contemporaneous positive impact on Taiwan’s military spending--greater hostility 
between China and the United States will lead Taiwan to increase its military spending, 
immediately.  This implies that a deteriorating US-China relationship is not good for 
Taiwan in the same calendar year because the latter must spend more funds on its annual 
military budget, which is not good news for its economic prosperity in the long-term 
perspective. 




         This latter finding is interesting because, unlike the United States, Taiwan's annual 
fiscal year starts on July 1st.  This allows Taiwan's military spending to respond to the 
level of external threat in a very timely way.  That is, any critical conflicts between the 
United States and China in the first half of a fiscal year will be more likely to boost 
Taiwan's military spending in that calendar year.  For instance, in the wake of the Taiwan 
Strait crisis in 1996 from March 8 to 25, Taiwan immediately increased military spending 
by purchasing the Patriot II anti-ballistic missile system from the United States to defend 
itself from possible PRC missile attacks. 
         This finding also implies that the higher the hostility in the US-China relationship, 
the more apt Taiwan would be to increase military spending to avoid the risk of 
entrapment, which occurs when a state is drawn by an ally into a conflict it otherwise 
would have avoided (Sorokin 1994).  It also may imply that Taiwan would be more likely 
to obtain sophisticated weapons from the United States when the US-China relationship 
turns sour.  This might explain in part why there exists a positive relationship between 
US-China hostility and Taiwan's military spending.  For instance, during the EP3 
collision accident, House of Representatives Foreign Relations Committee chairman, 
Henry Hyde, said that because China had not released the "hostages," (EP3 crew 
members) there are a lot of things the United States can do, including selling Taiwan the 
military weapons it has asked to buy (Sheng 2001 p. 61).  This logic may explain why US 
president George Bush agreed to sell Taiwan eight diesel-powered submarines and four 
Kidd-class destroyers in the biggest arms package for Taiwan in a decade after the EP3 
confrontations.   
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         Second, volatility in the extent of US-China hostility has a statistically significant 
negative effect on Taiwan’s military spending at the time lag t-1.  In other words, 
unstable US-China relations in a previous year would lead to a lower level of Taiwan’s 
military spending in a current year.  This finding implies that when the US-China 
relationship is stable, Taiwan will increase military spending to avoid the risk of 
abandonment, because Taiwan's leadership will feel more uncertainty about US 
commitment toward Taiwan.  Conversely, when the US-China relationship is unstable, 
Taiwan's security is perceived to become relatively greater because Taiwan's leadership is 
more confident that the United States will stick to its defense commitment and will be 
less likely to put its economic and commercial benefits in China ahead of its security 
commitment to Taiwan.  This also may imply that the volatile US-China relationship in 
the last year is in Taiwan's favor because Taiwan will decrease its military spending 
accordingly, which is conducive to its overall economic livelihood. 
         The most interesting implication of this statistical result concerns Taiwan's status as 
a pawn in the relationship between China and the United States.  A volatile US-China 
relationship will lead Taiwan to feel more secure due to a higher perceived US 
commitment or less risk of abandonment.  This will lead Taiwan to decrease military 
spending in response.  In addition, a heightened hostility between the United States and 
China is not good for Taiwan because the latter has to spend more on its military to avoid 
the risk of entrapment.  Taiwan has to tread a fine line between the two superpowers to 
survive.  In other words, Taiwan's security is tied to the tenor of the ongoing US-China 
relationship.  This may well explain why an unstable US-China relationship has negative 
effects on Taiwan's military spending, while a higher conflictual US-China relationship 
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has positive ones.   
         Third, the relation between Taiwan’s military spending and GNP registers a very 
strong significance at a level of 0.00001 with a t-statistic of 8.03.  In other words, growth 
in GNP is found to be strongly significant in determining Taiwan’s military expenditure 
growth.  Also, according to the results in Table 5-1, the ECM operating at time t-1 is 
statistically significant (p<0.001), and suggests the re-equilibrating adjustment is 29%.  
In other words, Taiwan’s military spending could be buffered from economic downturn, 
which would erode 29% of shock each year until the original level of military spending is 
realized.  This finding further supports the assumption of “Wealthy country, strong army” 
(Fuquo-Chyangpin), i.e., the importance of economic effects on military spending or, in 
more general terms, national security. 
         Fourth and finally, Taiwan’s saving rate is positively related (p< .02) to the growth 
of military expenditures.  Facing a constant military threat from China, Taiwan is more 
willing to save money to support its military buildup to counter external threats.  This is 
consistent with Benoit's (1978) psychological-linkage explanation that people are more 
likely to save in threatening situations, especially facing the possibility of war.  In 
addition, a high saving rate can be allocated to physical investment or capital provision 
that further increases a nation’s capital stock and reinforces GNP growth that leads to the 
growth of military spending (Chan and Clarke 1992).  
         This is analogous to the positive relation between Taiwan’s foreign investment 
(p<0.01) and Taiwan’s military spending.  Foreign investment provides very important 
support to finance a military buildup to alleviate external threats.  The positive 
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relationship between Taiwan's military spending and foreign investment supports this 
hypothesis.  
         The dummies for 1977, 1984, 1987, and 1991 are all statistically significant in the 
expected directions.  The major events that occurred in these years are listed in Table 5-3.    






     
 
    
         These political events as listed above, except in 1977, all have negative effects on 
the growth of Taiwan's military spending.  The political events listed in 1977, because 
they created higher perceived threats to Taiwan’s external and internal security, resulted 
in a higher level of military spending as argued and supported by this dissertation. 
         In sum, the error correction model provides a clear picture of Taiwan's military 
spending, which is strongly affected by external perceived threats as well as internal 
economic factors.  The hypotheses posited by this dissertation so far are strongly 
supported by the statistical outcomes.  However, before final conclusions are drawn, the 
size of effects, model specification and diagnostic tests are required. 
 
1977   1. Mao Tse-tung died in 1976;  
           2. Chungli political uprising occurred in Taiwan.   
       
1984   1. Chiang Nan political incident occurred in the United States;  
           2. Reagan visited Beijing and restated his six assurances to Taiwan. 
             
1987   1. Den Xiaoping started economic reforms in China; 
           2. DPP established in 1986; 
           3. Taiwan lifted martial law; 
           4. Lee Teng-hui stepped into power. 
 
1991   1. Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) in Taiwan and Association for  
               Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) in China were established; 
           2. Taiwan renounced the use of force for the pursuit of national unification.  
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2.Assessing the Size of Effects  
         In addition to the above discussion of significance of variables, one also should 
assess the substantive importance of these statistics by examining the effects of changes 
in the independent variables on the dependent variable.  This procedure is warranted, 
since a significant or non-zero effect can still be quite trivial in terms of its coefficient 
and size of effect.  However, examination of substantive importance is no easy task 
because of the various measurements and variability existing in the independent variables 
of interest.  Fortunately, the coefficients in the error correction model (ECM) estimated in 
Table 5-1 are a linear function; therefore, the calculation of size of major effects is 
straightforward as illustrated as follows: 



























         As shown above, the US-China Conflict Index exercises a substantial effect.  The 
mean (range: 13-327) is 124, reporting impact of .181 billion (US dollars) on Taiwan's 
military spending.  This coefficient indicates that a 1 score increase in US-China hostility 
would make Taiwan's military spending rise by 1.46 million.  The difference between the 
smallest conflict score 13 to the largest score 327 would be associated with an almost 
.459 billion increase in Taiwan's military spending over time.  
         Second, the mean volatility expressing the unstable relationship between China and 
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the United States is 25 (range 1-63), which would lead to a .209 billion decrease in 
Taiwan's military spending (see Figure 21).  On average, a 1 unit increase of volatility in 
US-China relationship would make Taiwan's military spending drop by 8.24 million.  
The difference between the largest score and the smallest score would be associated with 
a .519 billion decrease in Taiwan's military spending over time. 
 
Figure 5-2 US-China Volat i l i ty Effect
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         Third, the magnitude of GNP effects, short-run and long-run, should be taken into 
account separately.  The long-run is a state of cointegrating equilibrium where GNP and 
Taiwan's military spending are in balance and there is no tendency to change, while the 
short-run depicts the disequilibrium state where adjustment to the equilibrium is 
occurring (Hariss 1995 p. 25).  The calculation of GNP's short-run impact is relatively 
easier to estimate than the long-run one (see Figure 22).  To estimate GNP's long-run 


































































         As shown above, an increase in Taiwan's GNP (short-run effect) from a value of 
.17423 trillion to 5.57436 trillion (NT dollars) would increase Taiwan's military spending 
by .108 billion (US dollars) in the first year, and by 1.782 billion over time.  In contrast to 
the long-run effect, I derive a coefficient β1= .0068 of long-run effect relative to .0031 of 
the short-run one (see footnote 4 for details in mathematical calculation).  Judged from 
almost the double magnitude of the long-run coefficient than that of the short-run, one 
can predict that the long-run impact should be larger than that of the short-run. 
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Here one can see that if the GNP coefficient estimate accurately takes the error correction 
mechanism (cointegrating relationships) into account, the minimum impact of the 
parameter change would be from .108 billion to .237 in the first year.  The over-time 
impact of that consideration would be about a 3.909 billion increase in Taiwan's military 
spending.  The difference between the long-run effects and short-run effects is about 
2.127 billion over time.  Such a huge difference further justifies the adequacy of the ECM 
employed in this dissertation. 
         Fourth, the control variables, Taiwan's Saving Rate (range: 0.11-0.29) and Foreign 
Investment Percentage (range: 1-10), appear to exert substantial effects on Taiwan's 
military spending as expected.  




















     
As shown in Figure 24, the difference between the smallest saving rate during this time 
.11 to the largest .29 would be associated with almost a .735 billion increase in Taiwan's 
military spending over time.  This also indicates that on average, a 1 percent increase in 
saving rate would drive Taiwan's military spending up by 40.83 million.   
     From Figure 25 one sees that an increase in Taiwan's foreign investment rate per 1 
unit would result in an increase in Taiwan's military spending by 93.11 million on 
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average.  The over-time impact of this parameter would be associated with an increase in 
Taiwan's military spending by about .838 billion. 




























         Finally, one should note that any sizable change in Taiwan's military spending 
would often be the result of changes in different combinations of these major variables 
and control variables when other things are held equal.  Nonetheless, examinations of the 
substantive importance of each parameter do convincingly demonstrate that many of the 
independent variables analyzed in this study have decidedly nontrivial effects on 
Taiwan's military spending. 
 
3.Intepreting Diagnostics of ECM 
         The ECM has an outstanding fit, as shown in Table 5-2.  The adjusted R2 is .901 
and the standard error of estimate is 216.7.  For a check of first-order serial correlation, 
note that Durbin-Watson’s d in Table 5-1 is equal to 1.903, very close to the benchmark 
value 2.  This means there is no first-order serial correlation difficulty.  The correlograms 
of residuals and residuals squared in figures 5-7 and 5-8 also support that the residuals of 
the ECM model are all well behaved within the bounds of two standard errors. 
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Furthermore, the Breush-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM test, the F statistic, is 1.02 with 
probability of .476 as registered in Table 5-4.  This statistical finding further rejects the 
possibility of any higher order serial correlation existing among the lagged residuals. 
         The Jarque-Bera test for normality in Figure 5-9 indicates the residuals are normally 
distributed.  The probability level assured with the test statistic is 0.75, which is far 
greater than the critical level of .05.  The first-order autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (ARCH) F-statistic is 0.176 with a probability of  .68 as registered in 
Table 5-5.  The finding suggests that the null hypothesis, that the coefficients of the 
lagged squared residuals are all zero, cannot be rejected, that is, there is no first-order 
ARCH in residuals of the ECM.  White's Heteroskedasticity test is also employed.  As 
shown in Table 5-6, White’s F statistic is .244 with a probability of .99, which strongly 
indicates that one cannot reject the null hypotheses that errors are homoskedastic. 
Ramsey’s RESET Test examines the specification and stability of the model.  The F-
statistic in Table 5-7 is .038 with a probability of .85, which strongly suggests that the 
model’s linear functional form is adequate.  Finally, a multicollinearity check reveals 
there are no collinearity problems among the independent variables.  As shown in Table 
5-8, the highest correlation is 0.46 found between Taiwan's GNP and saving rate.  
        In sum, the results of the several diagnostic tests suggest that the ECM model 
performs very well.  There is also evidence that it is preferable to the budgetary 
incremental model.  A summary of results and model specifications is reported in Table 
5-2, which provides a comparison between the two competing models, ECM and BIM.3  
         In Table 5-2, ECM not only has a smaller standard error, a smaller Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC), and a higher adjusted R-squared but also has all 
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independent variables with significant and appropriate coefficient signs as suggested by 
theories discussed above.  Therefore, this study strongly suggests that ECM is a more 
robust model of the two providing better explanatory and predictive powers on 

























1. (1) Unbiasedness is the best-known desirable property of an estimator.  An unbiased  
    estimator is one that has a sampling distribution with a mean equal to the parameter 
    to be estimated.  It provides the information about the distance between the estimates  
    and the value of the parameter; the sum of all negative and positive distances should  
    be equal to zero.  If the sampling distribution is symmetric, then an estimator being  
    unbiased implies that half of all possible estimates are higher and half are lower than  
    the value of the parameter (Kmenta 1997).  An unbiased estimator gives on average a 
    perfect estimated result.  
 
    (2) Efficiency is a further desirable property of an estimator.  It is a property concerned  
    with the distances of the values of an estimator from the value of the parameter.  A  
    generally accepted definition of efficiency is if we restrict our consideration to  
    unbiased estimators only; the most efficient estimator is one that has the smallest  
    dispersion or, in specific, the smallest variance among the estimators (Kmenta 1997). 
 
   (3) Consistency is another desirable property.  This property focuses on changes in the  
    sampling distribution as sample sizes are increased.  An estimator is said to be  
    consistent if its sampling distribution tends to become concentrated on the true value of  
    the parameter as sample size reaches to infinity.  Consistency is an important property  
    because it guarantees that our estimates improve with sample size that is we can have  
    greater reliability by increasing our sample size (Kmenta 1997).  
 
2. The calculation of the long-run effect is as follows: 
    ∆Yt  = B0 + B1∆Xt - α(Y-C0- C1X)t-1 + Et 
    Yt -Yt-1 = B0 + B1(Xt  -Xt-1) -αYt-1 + αC0 + αC1 Xt-1 
    Yt = Yt-1 + B0 + B1Xt - B1Xt-1- αYt-1 + αC0 + αC1 Xt-1    
    Yt = (1- α) Yt-1 + B0 cXt + (αC1 -B1) Xt-1+ αC0 
    short-run effect = B1 = 0.0031 
    long-run effect= B1* = B1 + (αC1 -B1)/ (1- α) = αC1 / (1- α) 
    Given ECM coefficient α = -.2939 and C1= .0016  
   ∴ B1* = .2939 * .0016/ (1- .2939) = .0068 
 
 
3. (1) Equation for ECM: 
      D(T_MILEXP) = 0.003074265136*D(T_GNP(-1)) - 0.2938716404*ECM(-1) +    
      1.463098935*UC_HOSTILITY + 4081.056869*D(T_SAVING) + 93.10623569*D(T_FORINV)  
      + 500.1026204*YR1977 - 769.7152907*YR1984 - 2255.457421*YR1987 - 65.9223963*    




 (2) Equation for Incremental Model (BIM): 
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    D(T_MILEXP) = 0.002803570366*D(T_GNP(-1)) - 0.1608206196*D(T_MILEXP(-1)) +  
    1.693025137*UC_HOSTILITY + 3866.676107*D(T_SAVING) + 100.5635099*D(T_FORINV) +  
    641.9664948*YR1977 - 1095.984018*YR1984 - 2726.781185*YR1987 - 538.2968161   
    *YR1991 - 2.018289027*UC_VARIANCE(-1) - 126.035663 
 
4. For more detailed statistical information of the incremental model, please see Table 5- 

























CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
6.1 Conclusions  
         As suggested by this dissertation, the US-China relationship has statistically 
significant, substantively important effects on Taiwan's military spending.  According to 
the findings, Taiwanese perceptions of external threat, along with domestic economic 
strength, are the key factors in determining the dynamics of Taiwan's military spending.  
I used the US-China relationship as the major independent variable and specified an error 
correction model to estimate its dynamic effects on Taiwan's military spending.  
         The contemporaneous and positive impact of the US-China hostility on Taiwan's 
military spending implies that a hostile US-China relationship is not good for Taiwan 
because the latter must spend more funds on military buildup, which is bad news for its 
economic prosperity.  In other words, a better US-China relationship is beneficial to 
Taiwan in the short-term perspective because the hostility has an immediate impact on 
Taiwan's military spending in the same calendar year as suggested by this dissertation.    
         In contrast, the US-China volatility has a lagged (time t-1) and negative impact on 
Taiwan's military spending, implying that a volatile US-China relationship is in Taiwan's 
favor because it may prompt Taiwan to decrease its military spending, which, in turn, is 
conducive to its overall security and economy in the long-term perspective.  These two 
statistical findings indicate the complexity of the US-China relationship on Taiwan's 
military spending.  As mentioned in the beginning of this study, three contrasting 
scholarly views are heatedly debated, and answers to these questions have baffled 
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policymakers in Washington, Beijing, and Taipei.  However, the empirical evidence 
provided by this study suggests that the timely effect is the key factor to better 
understanding the whole picture regarding the impact of US-China relations on Taiwan's 
military spending.  That is, a hostile US-China relationship is harmful to Taiwan in the 
same calendar year while the volatile US-China relationship of this year is in Taiwan's 
favor as it would be associated with a lower level of military spending in the next year.  
This finding may explain why the 1979 US-China normalization indicated a lower degree 
of hostility but a high volatility between the United States and China.  As expected, this 
did result in a decrease in Taiwan's military spending the following year (1980).  In other 
words, the immediate impact of hostility alone cannot fully capture the dynamic 
interactions between the United States and China; one also needs to take the impact of 
historical volatility into account in order to get the whole picture of the effects of US-
China relations on Taiwan's military spending.   
         According to these statistical findings, this study further suggests that if the well-
being of Taiwan is a key consideration, the United States should establish cooperative 
instead of competitive relations with China while forging stronger and closer ties with 
Taiwan.  The former will reduce Taiwan's perception of the risk of entrapment, and the 
latter will relax Taiwan's worries about the risk of abandonment.  Furthermore, an 
improved US-China relationship and stronger US commitment to Taiwan's security will 
encourage Taiwan more confidently to engage with China politically as well as 
economically.  This not only will lead Taiwan to spend less on military buildup and 
prevent a possible arms race from taking place but also will promote mutual 
understanding and cooperation between China and Taiwan.  An improved China-Taiwan 
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relationship, in turn, is in the United States favor because it will greatly reduce the 
dangerous possibility of direct military confrontation between the United States and 
China, and will eventually contribute to the security and stability of the whole Asia-
Pacific region.  
         As far as methodology is concerned, the error correction model is a part of 
cointegration methodology designed to describe the tendency of Taiwan's military 
spending and GNP to move together over time.  As shown in Figures 5-3 and 5-4, the 
error correction mechanism captured not only the short-run effects of GNP growth on 
Taiwan's military spending but also the long-run ones that indicates the better fit of the 
ECM relative to the BIM.  In addition, a Granger Causality test also was employed to 
investigate the impact of GNP on Taiwan's military spending.  As shown in Table 4, 
Taiwan's military spending can be better predicted by using values of GNP in addition to 
its own past history than by the latter alone.   
         Overall, as the theoretical diagram shows (see Figure 3-1), the US-China hostility 
perceived as an external threat to Taiwan and a function of changes in the level of 
external threat has a statistically significant positive impact on Taiwan's military 
spending.  Fears of the higher external threat because of a higher risk of possible 
entrapment emanated from a higher conflictual US-China hostility; Taiwan would 
increase military spending in response.   
         US-China volatility as reflected through perceptions of US commitment has 
statistically significant negative effects on Taiwan's military spending.  The higher 
volatility in the US-China relationship perceived as a stronger US commitment will 
decrease Taiwan's military spending because of the perceived lower risk of abandonment 
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from the United States.  This also may imply that Taiwan might try to avoid provoking 
China when the US-Taiwan relationship is being cemented Taiwan, a pawn caught 
between China and the United States, has to tread a fine line between these two big 
powers to survive.    
         It is noteworthy that Taiwan with high security concerns, volatility in US-China 
relations, matters more than the direct China military threats.  The latter measured by 
China's annual military spending did not reach a statistically significant result as 
suggested by this study (see Table 5-14).  Moreover, Taiwan's fears of abandonment or 
entrapment flowing from dyadic interactions between the United States and China can 
mitigate or magnify Taiwan's perceptions of threat, leading to behavior not predicated by 
arms race's action-reaction theory.1  
         In contrast, the domestic economic factors such as GNP growth, foreign investment, 
and saving rate all obtain a statistically significant impact on Taiwan's military spending 
in the expected direction.  That is, the greater the economic strength, Taiwan will have 
more resources to support its military spending (other conditions held constant).  In other 
words, Fuquo-Chyangpin or "Rich nation; strong army" is applicable to the case of 
Taiwan.  This finding also may imply that an economic slowdown would lead to a 
decrease in Taiwan's military spending.   
         A major implication of this study is that when Taiwan determines that its national 
security is at stake it will commit significant financial resources in order to attain the 
weapons it deems necessary to preserve its security.  Specifically, the external factor of 
interactions between the United States and China contributes to the size of Taiwan’s 
military expenditures.  This implies that a peaceful US-China relationship perceived as a 
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lower degree of external threat is conducive to Taiwan because it will lead to an 
immediate decrease in Taiwan's military spending in the same calendar year.  On the 
other hand, a volatile US-China relationship is in Taiwan's favor because the United 
States might be more likely to emphasize the instrumental value of Taiwan when it is in 
jeopardy with Beijing.  Meanwhile, Taiwan will be more willing to decrease its military 
spending when the US commitment is perceived as more reliable and the risk of 
abandonment is relatively lower.  Having said so, Taiwan would avoid further provoking 
China for its own good, and would decrease its military spending in the following year to 
mitigate the heightened tension that emanated from a deterioration of US-China 
relationship.  This is due to Taiwan's security and economic livelihood being dependent 
on a good bilateral relationship with China.  That is, Taiwan is caught between the two 
big powers and has to retain a balancing strategy between them.  The confluence of these 
impacts contributes to a negative correlation between the volatility of US-China 
relationship and Taiwan's military spending as supported by analyses presented in 
Chapter Five (see Table 5-2).  In short, the findings of this study not only illustrate the 
pawn status of Taiwan but also support the significant effects of US-China relations on 
Taiwan's military spending.   
         Although the Taiwan Relation Act manifests the US security commitment to 
Taiwan, it provides the United States only with an “option” to defend Taiwan and does 
not mention the defense of the offshore islands (Hickey 1999).  The TRA does not 
necessarily commit the United States to Taiwan’s defense in the future event of war 
between China and Taiwan (Clough 1999).  In other words, there was no clear guiding 
principle or obligation for the United States to follow when considering defending 
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Taiwan in the event of war with China.  Taiwan is understandably sensitive to even an 
iota of change in US attitudes toward the island.  
         This US policy of status quo or strategic ambiguity toward the Taiwan problem is 
more complicated than often thought because it creates a greater risk of miscalculation 
between China and Taiwan (Lasater and Yu 2000 p. 234).  For example, Beijing's first 
strike force might raise the danger of preemptive war.  On the other hand, Taiwan could 
decide to renew its efforts to develop the massive destructive weapons such as nuclear 
weapons and national missile defense and it also could encourage Taiwan to launch a 
defensive war against China (Gertz 2000).  In principle, the success of deterrence is based 
on transparency and capability rather than ambiguity.  Thus, China and Taiwan should be 
told clearly under what conditions the United States will use force to intervene.  This 
would allow both sides to calculate with accuracy whether to proceed with their desired 
course of action (Swaine and Mulvenon 2001); therefore, it would greatly reduce both 
sides seeking to exploit loopholes and cleavages of the policy of ambiguous status quo.  
         Ironically, the ambiguity of the US commitment toward Taiwan’s security helps 
Taiwan's military forces obtain a lion’s share of the governmental budget every year.  
The threat China poses to Taiwan also gives ammunition for the government of the latter 
to obtain quantitatively and qualitatively greater levels of weaponry and related military 
assistance from the United States, and to develop closer political and military relations 
between Taipei and Washington (Swaine and Mulvenon 2001).  However, the risk of 
abandonment from the United States motivates Taiwan to establish its own defense 
capabilities, which on the other hand, greatly reduces the US’s defense burden.  In 
addition, the US role as a monopolized weapon supplier to Taiwan is not only beneficial 
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to the US's defense-industry complex but also to its economic prosperity in general.  This 
might further explain why the US foreign policy of strategic ambiguity toward China and 
Taiwan has been sustained.     
         In contrast, China also has something to gain from the US's policy of status quo 
toward Taiwan.  "Beijing's communist government needs an adversary to remain in 
power.  That is the justification for violations of their own constitution exalting freedom 
and other concepts and the pervasive police apparatus that keep them in power" (Gertz 
2000 p. 170).  Furthermore, a democratic and prosperous Taiwan not only is a beacon of 
hope for China to peacefully transform its political institutions but also helps to 
accelerate its economic development.  To a great extent, the Taiwan problem also 
motivates China's efforts to ameliorate relations with Washington and, in particular, to 
obtain a pledge to oppose Taiwan's political independence and to reduce its level of 
military assistance to Taiwan (Clough 1999).  In turn, a good US-China relationship also 
helps China to mitigate its defense burdens due to military threats from China's potential 
rivals such as Russia, India, Vietnam, and Japan.  This is good for China's continual 
economic livelihood and prosperity.  Furthermore, a wealthy China will be a society 
dominated by a large and better-educated middle class.  Such a society is much more 
likely to become democratic than the poor peasant societies of China’s past and more 
likely to respect human rights and to avoid war (Vogel 1997 p. 160). 
         With these common interests in mind, the status quo policy is the only acceptable 
formula that Beijing-Taipei-Washington can live with so far.  Therefore, in the 
foreseeable future, if other things are held equal, this study expects that the US-China 
relationship will continue to be the most important external factor along with domestic 
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GNP growth, savings rate, and foreign investment that determine the dynamics of 
Taiwan's military spending.  
 
6.2 Recommendations for Future Research 
         The findings discussed above prompt recommendations for future research.  First, 
the WEIS data set should be updated to the present allowing a much larger time frame for 
analysis.  Meanwhile different sources of data such as military expenditures and US-
China dyadic interactions should be employed to crosscheck the robustness of empirical 
evidence reached by the error correction model introduced by this dissertation.      
         In this study, I used the military expenditures data collected by the US Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA).  However, other available data sources such 
as China's and Taiwan's official statistical data books and the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) data also should be employed to provide multiple 
measures of military spending.  
         US-China dyadic interactions data collected from the WEIS data set should be 
compared with the Brecher and Wilkenfeld International Crisis Behavior Project data set 
from 1918 to 1997, available from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and 
Social Research (ICPSR).  In addition, Azar's (1980) Conflict and Peace Data Bank 
(COPDAB) from 1948 to 1978 could be merged with the WEIS data set.  Thus a longer 
time span can be created to solve the over-determination or too many variables and too 
small a sample size problem.  By using and comparing different sources of data, future 
studies can re-estimate and extend the research presented in this dissertation.  
        Second, although this dissertation suggests that China's military spending does not 
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have statistically significant effects on Taiwan's military spending, it is remiss to say that 
China's military capability has no relationship with Taiwan's security.  Perhaps, the focus 
of military capability is not military spending per se but weapons counts (Bolks and Stoll 
2000).  It is plausible that China does not necessarily change its military expenditures the 
same way Taiwan changes its expenditures or vice versa.  For example, China often 
reacts to an increase in Taiwan's military spending by improving weapon destructiveness 
without showing any apparent increase in its military budget (Li, Hu and Zhong 1998, 
Sun and Yu 1999).  Given China's deliberate deception about its level of its military 
spending (Sun and Yu 1999), one must be skeptical about findings based on analyses of 
China's military spending in the previous studies.  
         Huntington (1983) points out that normally rival states engaging in an arms race 
will focus on the type of military force with which they are best able to harm each other 
(see also Bolks and Stoll 2000).  Future studies may start with the approach that weapon 
stockpiles--in particular the number of ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan--better reflect 
China's military capability and intention than military expenditures as a single measure of 
the external threat posed by the PRC to Taiwan.    
         Third, the results published in this dissertation should be investigated by additional 
statistical analyses.  If it is true that Taiwan is only a pawn state of the United States as 
described by this dissertation, then Taiwan's interactions with China should be affected 
by US-China dyadic interactions.  For future studies, the Weak Exogeneity Test should 
be employed to investigate whether the US-China relationship is exogenous to the 
Taiwan-China relationship.  In contrast, if the United States is more likely to sell 
sophisticated weapons to Taiwan when the US-China relationship is unstable, then there 
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should exist a negative correlation between the total amount of US arms sales to Taiwan 
and the volatility of the US-China relationship.  In other words, a simple negative 
correlation coefficient should be observed between them.  
         Fourth, the uncertain reliability of US commitment has caused Taiwan to probe the 
strength of US resolve to defend Taiwan.  In future studies, it is important to investigate 
factors--American public opinion, congressional involvement in the Taiwan issue, regime 
changes, human rights effects--that directly led to US intervention in the Taiwan Strait, 
and which are apt to increase or decrease the probability of future US intervention in the 
Taiwan Strait.  Both questions are obviously related to Taiwan's security and Taiwan's 
military spending.  
         Fifth, apart from the United States, Japan's role in Taiwan security also should have 
some effects on Taiwan's military spending.  Japan has been one of Taiwan's most 
important supporters second to the United States, given the fact that Taiwan is one of 
Japan's most important economic partners and a former colony.  Under the revision of 
1978 guidelines, Japan can provide support, including the supply of fuel and the transport 
of soldiers, for US forces in areas surrounding Japan when the country's peace and 
security is threatened (Clough 1999, Gong 2000, Lasater and Yu 2000, Sheng 2001b, 
Swaine and Mulvenon 2001).  Thus, Japan's attitude and commitment toward the Taiwan 
dispute is another external factor that should be further explored in future studies.  
         The sixth and last recommendation is to construct a forecasting model.  For 
example, one might employ a transfer function model (Box and Jenkins 1970) where the 
US-China relationship is the input variable and Taiwan's military spending is an output 
one.  This model is designed to capture the input-output relationship between time series, 
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thereby being able to establish the dynamic nature of the process between US-China 
relationship and Taiwan's military spending.  By manipulation of the input variable, one 
can know by how much and over how many years Taiwan's military spending is going to 
change as a result of increases in the levels of hostility between the United States and 
China.2  
 
6.3 A Final Word 
         In this dissertation, I have shown that Taiwan's military spending is shaped by 
external factors, the perceived risks of abandonment and entrapment emanating from the 
ongoing US-China relationship, and internal factors, a set of domestic economic 
constraints such as GNP growth, saving rate, and foreign investment.  The empirical 
findings of this study reinforce the belief that both internal and external factors have to be 
considered simultaneously if one is to fully understand the dynamics of Taiwan's military 
spending.  The ECM recommended by this study has aided researchers in understanding 
the short-run and long-run effects of GNP on Taiwan's military spending.  This has been 
ignored in previous studies adopting the BIM.  This study has sought to address Taiwan's 
security in general and to investigate the variation of Taiwan's military spending 
specifically.  The findings presented here do fully explain the interplaying effects of 
international and domestic environments on Taiwan's military spending, and single out 
Taiwan's pawn status caught between an aggressive China and an assertive America.  
However, for future research, there is a great deal of effort, as suggested, waiting to be 
made.  






1. (1) Abandonment is the fear that the ally may leave the alliance, may not live up to  
    explicit commitment, or may fail to provide support in contingencies where support is  
    expected (Mandelbaum 1981, pp. 151-52; Snyder 1984, p. 467; Cha 2000, p. 265). 
 
   (2) Entrapment occurs when an alliance commitment turns detrimental to one's interests  
   (Snyder 1984, p. 467; Cha 2000, p. 265). 
 
2. To carry out the transfer function model we should follow the steps as below. 
   (1) Diagnose an appropriate univariate ARIMA model for the input variable(s) and  
         output variable. 
   (2) Identify the Transfer Function including a prewhitening step and Cross-Correlate  
         Functions (CCF). 
   (3) Estimate the parameters in the transfer function model. 
   (4) Diagnose on the residuals whether they are white noise. 
   (5) If not white noise, remodify model and start over again. 
             Following these steps we can derive a best single forecasting equation by  
   examining the residuals based on acf and pacf.  Then we compute a forecasted value for  





































































APPENDIX I: WEIS INTERNATIONAL EVENT CODES                                                            
 
     Yield (01)                                      
011. Surrender, yield or order, submit to arrest, etc. 
     This category requires explicit statement of  
     surrender, or yield to a command or an order, or of  
     submission to arrest.                           
012. Yield position, retreat; evacuate. This category  
     involves actual physical movement.                                         
013. Admit wrongdoing; retract statement.               
 
     Comment (02)                                     
021. Explicit decline to comment. This category is reserved  
     for an expressed "decline to comment" statement by an              
     official spokesperson. This category does not include  
     a reported "failure to comment."                                      
022. Comment on situation--pessimistic. This category is  
     used only when the actor explicitly expresses the  
     feeling that the situation is adverse or foreboding.                                       
023. Comment on situation--neutral.                     
024. Comment on situation--optimistic. This category is 
     used only when the actor explicitly expresses the  
     feeling that the situation is favorable.                   
025. Explain policy or future position. This category is  
     used when governments express their goals, hopes,  
     policies, or future plans to others.                        
 
     Consult (03)                                     
031. Meet with at neutral site, or send note. This category  
     is used for meetings at an unspecified or neutral             
     site, or between a resident ambassador and the host  
     country. This category applies, in addition, when  
     notes are sent between nations but their content is  
     unknown.                                
032. Visit; go to.                                      
033. Receive visit; host.                               
 
     Approve (04)                                     
041. Praise, hail, applaud, condole. This category includes  
     the "politeness" events such as expressions of 
     gratitude, condolences, and ceremonial salutations.            
042. Endorse other's policy or position; give verbal  




     Promise (05)                                     
051. Promise own policy support.                        
052. Promise material support. This category specifies men 
     and/or resource aid forthcoming.                                  
053. Promise other future support action.               
054. Assure; reassure.  This category is used for 
     expressions or reiterations of earlier pledges.                               
 
     Grant (06)                                      
061. Express regret; apologize.                         
062. Give state invitation.                             
063. Grant asylum.  This category includes both the 
     announcement of a policy and reported cases of  
     granting of refuge to nationals of other countries.                  
064. Grant privilege, diplomatic recognition; DE FACTO  
     relations, etc.              
065. Suspend negative sanctions; truce.                 
066. Release and/or return persons or property.                                         
 
     Reward (07)                                     
071. Extend economic aid (as gift and/or loan).                                            
072. Extend military assistance.  This category includes 
     both men and material, in addition, joint military             
     training exercises are coded in this category.                                         
073. Give other assistance.                             
 
     Agree (08)                                      
081. Make substantive agreement.                        
082. Agree to future action or procedure; agree to meet, to  
     negotiate.  This category includes the acceptance of               
     invitations from other states.                     
 
     Request (09)                                     
091. Ask for information.                               
092. Ask for policy assistance.                         
093. Ask for material assistance.                       
094. Request action; call for.  This category includes bids  
     from United Nations membership and requests for  
     asylum.                                            
095. Entreat; plead; appeal to; help me. This category  
     applies to requests made from a distinctly suppliant  
     position, the actor nation pleading for aid or  
     support.                                           
 
     Propose (10)                                     
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101. Offer proposal.                                    
102. Urge or suggest action or policy.                  
 
     Reject (11)                                     
111. Turn down proposal; reject protest demand, threat,  
     etc.                               
112. Refuse; oppose; refuse to allow.                   
 
     Accuse (12)                                     
121. Charge; criticize; blame; disapprove.              
122. Denounce; denigrate; abuse.  This category often   
     applies when derogatory adjectives embellish the   
     accusation.               
 
     Protest (13)                                     
131. Make complaint (not formal).                       
132. Make formal complaint or protest. Protests are assumed  
     to be formal unless otherwise stated.                          
 
     Deny (14)                                      
141. Deny an accusation.                                
142. Deny an attributed policy, action role or position.                                 
 
     Demand (15)                                     
150. Issue order or command; insist; demand compliance;  
     etc.                            
 
     Warn (16)                                      
160. Give warning. Occasionally the words "demand" or  
     "threaten" are used in news items which should be  
     coded as warnings.                                       
 
     Threaten (17)                                    
171. Threat without specific negative sanctions.                                        
172. Threat with specific non-military negative sanctions.                               
173. Threat with force specified.                       
174. Ultimatum; threat with negative sanctions and time  
     limit specified.                
 
     Demonstrate (18)                                   
181. Non-military demonstration; to walk out on.  This  
     category applies to activities such as marching,                      
     picketing, stoning, etc., when they are performed by  
     citizens of one nation against another nation. The  
     category also includes occasions when representatives                    
     to international meetings walk out in protest.                                   
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182. Armed force mobilization.  Exercise and/or display  
     routine ceremonial displays such as weapons parades  
     and "fly bys" are not included in this category.                                         
 
     Reduce Relations(as negative sanctions)(19)                   
191. Cancel or postpone planned event.                  
192. Reduce routine international activity; recall 
     officials; etc. Events coded in this category must be  
     connected with some ongoing international problem,  
     thus the usual rotations of foreign service officers  
     or normal changes in foreign aid are not regarded as  
     "reduction of relations."  Embargoes, bans, and  
     smaller activities do fall within this category.                                    
193. Reduce or halt aid.                                
194. Halt negotiations.                                 
195. Break diplomatic relations.                        
 
     Expel (20)                                      
201. Order personnel out of country.  This category  
     includes the expulsion of foreign individuals and the  
     declaration of individuals as PERSONA NON GRATA.                                
202. Expel organization or group.                       
 
     Seize (21)                                      
211. Seize position or possessions.  The category also may  
     be used when a nation militarily takes or occupies  
     another's territory.                      
212. Detain or arrest person(s).                        
 
     Force (22)                                      
221. Non-injury obstructive act.  When actual physical  
     destruction is reported, demonstrations are coded in             
     this category.                                     
222. Non-military injury-destruction. This category also  
     includes acts not committed by organized military  
     forces such as terrorist bombings.                        
223. Military engagement.  Notice that this category may  
     often be "double-coded" because when two nations                   
     battle, each is an actor and each is a target of  
     force. 
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APPENDIX II: CUDYAD/CTDYAD VARIABLE RECODING SCHEME 
 
if (var3='REJ1') dyad=01. 
if (var3='REJ2') dyad=02. 
if (var3='ACC1') dyad=03. 
if (var3='ACC2') dyad=04. 
if (var3='PTT1') dyad=05. 
if (var3='PTT2') dyad=06. 
if (var3='DNY1') dyad=07. 
if (var3='DNY2') dyad=08. 
if (var3='DMD1') dyad=09. 
if (var3='WRN1') dyad=10. 
if (var3='THR1') dyad=11. 
if (var3='THR2') dyad=12. 
if (var3='THR3') dyad=13. 
if (var3='THR4') dyad=14. 
if (var3='DEM1') dyad=15. 
if (var3='DEM2') dyad=16. 
if (var3='RDC1') dyad=17. 
if (var3='RDC2') dyad=18. 
if (var3='RDC3') dyad=19. 
if (var3='RDC4') dyad=20. 
if (var3='RDC5') dyad=21. 
if (var3='EXP1') dyad=22. 
if (var3='EXP2') dyad=23. 
if (var3='SZE1') dyad=24. 
if (var3='SZE2') dyad=25. 
if (var3='FOR1') dyad=26. 
if (var3='FOR2') dyad=27. 




























Table 4-1 Augmented D-F Test on D(T_MILEXP) 
ADF Test Statistic -5.468540     1%   Critical Value* -4.3738 
      5%   Critical Value -3.6027 
      10% Critical Value -3.2367 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(T_MILEXP,2) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 12/04/01   Time: 11:30 
Sample(adjusted): 1968 1992 
Included observations: 25 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
D(T_MILEXP(-1)) -1.152055 0.210670 -5.468540 0.0000 
C 134.2576 307.1251 0.437143 0.6663 
@TREND(1966) 16.55598 19.73368 0.838971 0.4105 
R-squared 0.576176     Mean dependent var 16.60000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.537647     S.D. dependent var 1032.228 
S.E. of regression 701.8799     Akaike info criterion 16.05757 
Sum squared resid 10837979     Schwarz criterion 16.20383 
Log likelihood -197.7196     F-statistic 14.95417 















Table 4-2 Augmented D-F Test on UC_HOSTILITY 
ADF Test Statistic -3.546394     1%   Critical Value* -3.7204 
      5%   Critical Value -2.9850 
      10% Critical Value -2.6318 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(UC_HOSTILITY) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 12/04/01   Time: 14:21 
Sample(adjusted): 1968 1992 
Included observations: 25 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
UC_HOSTILITY(-1) -0.724551 0.204306 -3.546394 0.0018 
D(UC_HOSTILITY(-1)) -0.286901 0.162515 -1.765385 0.0914 
C 73.36723 28.78151 2.549110 0.0183 
R-squared 0.587838     Mean dependent var -9.840000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.550369     S.D. dependent var 108.7998 
S.E. of regression 72.95515     Akaike info criterion 11.52973 
Sum squared resid 117094.0     Schwarz criterion 11.67600 
Log likelihood -141.1217     F-statistic 15.68857 
















Table 4-3 Augmented D-F Test on D(T_GNP) 
ADF Test Statistic -3.854601     1%   Critical Value* -4.3738 
      5%   Critical Value -3.6027 
      10% Critical Value -3.2367 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(T_GNP,2) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 12/04/01   Time: 15:01 
Sample(adjusted): 1968 1992 
Included observations: 25 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
D(T_GNP(-1)) -0.917236 0.237959 -3.854601 0.0009 
C -58221.32 30444.21 -1.912394 0.0689 
@TREND(1966) 17543.05 4419.670 3.969313 0.0006 
R-squared 0.421240     Mean dependent var 21600.52 
Adjusted R-squared 0.368625     S.D. dependent var 77880.36 
S.E. of regression 61883.02     Akaike info criterion 25.01605 
Sum squared resid 8.42E+10     Schwarz criterion 25.16231 
Log likelihood -309.7006     F-statistic 8.006150 
















Table 4-4 Granger Causality Tests on T_MILEXP and T_GNP 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 12/04/01   Time: 15:33 
Sample: 1966 1992 
Lags: 2 
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
  T_MILEXP does not Granger Cause T _GNP 25  1.29366  0.29625 






































Table 4-6 Augmented D-F Test on ECM 
ADF Test Statistic -2.735206     1%   Critical Value* -3.7343 
      5%   Critical Value -2.9907 
      10% Critical Value -2.6348 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(ECM) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 12/05/01   Time: 11:14 
Sample(adjusted): 1969 1992 
Included observations: 24 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
ECM(-1) -0.572374 0.209262 -2.735206 0.0124 
D(ECM(-1)) 0.177454 0.211592 0.838661 0.4111 
C 33.69806 121.9873 0.276242 0.7851 
R-squared 0.269067     Mean dependent var -0.612413 
Adjusted R-squared 0.199454     S.D. dependent var 664.4841 
S.E. of regression 594.5354     Akaike info criterion 15.72991 
Sum squared resid 7422919.     Schwarz criterion 15.87716 
Log likelihood -185.7589     F-statistic 3.865196 
















Table 4-7 Augmented D-F Test on D(T_FOEINV) 
ADF Test Statistic -6.053469     1%   Critical Value* -3.7343 
      5%   Critical Value -2.9907 
      10% Critical Value -2.6348 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(T_FORINV,2) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 12/05/01   Time: 11:29 
Sample(adjusted): 1969 1992 
Included observations: 24 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
D(T_FORINV(-1)) -1.283054 0.211954 -6.053469 0.0000 
C 0.053624 0.407356 0.131638 0.8965 
R-squared 0.624858     Mean dependent var -0.208333 
Adjusted R-squared 0.607806     S.D. dependent var 3.168584 
S.E. of regression 1.984338     Akaike info criterion 4.288103 
Sum squared resid 86.62713     Schwarz criterion 4.386274 
Log likelihood -49.45723     F-statistic 36.64449 
















Table 4-8 Augmented D-F Test on D(T-SAVING) 
ADF Test Statistic -4.612952     1%   Critical Value* -3.7204 
      5%   Critical Value -2.9850 
      10% Critical Value -2.6318 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(T_SAVING,2) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 12/05/01   Time: 11:46 
Sample(adjusted): 1968 1992 
Included observations: 25 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
D(T_SAVING(-1)) -0.971111 0.210518 -4.612952 0.0001 
C 0.003084 0.006969 0.442570 0.6622 
R-squared 0.480570     Mean dependent var -0.000800 
Adjusted R-squared 0.457986     S.D. dependent var 0.046986 
S.E. of regression 0.034592     Akaike info criterion -3.813788 
Sum squared resid 0.027521     Schwarz criterion -3.716278 
Log likelihood 49.67235     F-statistic 21.27933 
















Table 4-9 Augmented D-F Test on UC_VARIANCE 
ADF Test Statistic -2.757092     1%   Critical Value* -3.7204 
      5%   Critical Value -2.9850 
      10% Critical Value -2.6318 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(UC_VARIANCE) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 12/05/01   Time: 12:18 
Sample(adjusted): 1968 1992 
Included observations: 25 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
UC_VARIANCE(-1) -0.520659 0.188843 -2.757092 0.0115 
D(UC_VARIANCE(-1)) 0.046006 0.178030 0.258420 0.7985 
C 12.08941 5.222900 2.314692 0.0303 
R-squared 0.313897     Mean dependent var -0.908816 
Adjusted R-squared 0.251524     S.D. dependent var 14.08015 
S.E. of regression 12.18137     Akaike info criterion 7.949860 
Sum squared resid 3264.489     Schwarz criterion 8.096125 
Log likelihood -96.37324     F-statistic 5.032580 
















Table 4-10 Augmented D-F Test on D(C_MILEXP) 
ADF Test Statistic -6.745572     1%   Critical Value* -4.3738 
      5%   Critical Value -3.6027 
      10% Critical Value -3.2367 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(C_MILEXP,2) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 12/05/01   Time: 12:51 
Sample(adjusted): 1968 1992 
Included observations: 25 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
D(C_MILEXP(-1)) -1.349797 0.200101 -6.745572 0.0000 
C 3881.593 1336.584 2.904115 0.0082 
@TREND(1966) -197.4126 82.66972 -2.387967 0.0260 
R-squared 0.674088     Mean dependent var 163.2400 
Adjusted R-squared 0.644459     S.D. dependent var 4672.518 
S.E. of regression 2786.093     Akaike info criterion 18.81483 
Sum squared resid 1.71E+08     Schwarz criterion 18.96110 
Log likelihood -232.1854     F-statistic 22.75142 
















Table 5-4 Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test on ECM 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: 
F-statistic 1.018711     Probability 0.475905 
Obs*R-squared 10.82793     Probability 0.093842 
     
Test Equation: 
Dependent Variable: RESID 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 12/06/01   Time: 18:03 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
D(T_GNP(-1)) 0.000497 0.000457 1.088832 0.3079 
ECM(-1) -0.013549 0.127883 -0.105946 0.9182 
UC_HOSTILITY -0.208177 0.831494 -0.250366 0.8086 
D(T_SAVING) 1094.394 1980.788 0.552504 0.5957 
D(T_FORINV) 15.23684 34.69072 0.439220 0.6721 
YR1977 -383.2755 320.7296 -1.195012 0.2663 
YR1984 -38.16891 556.4740 -0.068591 0.9470 
YR1987 163.0975 309.0208 0.527788 0.6120 
YR1991 -84.87261 265.7122 -0.319416 0.7576 
UC_VARIANCE(-1) 0.109792 4.164351 0.026365 0.9796 
C -27.20259 158.5358 -0.171586 0.8680 
RESID(-1) -0.265748 0.426506 -0.623081 0.5506 
RESID(-2) -0.193631 0.555549 -0.348540 0.7364 
RESID(-3) 0.021942 0.432498 0.050733 0.9608 
RESID(-4) -0.994299 0.431673 -2.303362 0.0502 
RESID(-5) -0.421069 0.566260 -0.743597 0.4784 
RESID(-6) -0.236447 0.630061 -0.375276 0.7172 
R-squared 0.433117     Mean dependent var 1.36E-14 
Adjusted R-squared -0.700648     S.D. dependent var 165.5117 
S.E. of regression 215.8420     Akaike info criterion 13.80754 
Sum squared resid 372702.1     Schwarz criterion 14.63637 
Log likelihood -155.5942     F-statistic 0.382017 









































Table 5-7 Ramsey RESET Test on Specification and Stability of ECM 
Ramsey RESET Test: 
F-statistic 0.038121     Probability 0.848218 
Log likelihood ratio 0.073203     Probability 0.786729 
     
Test Equation: 
Dependent Variable: D(T_MILEXP) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 12/06/01   Time: 19:40 
Sample: 1968 1992 
Included observations: 25 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
D(T_GNP(-1)) 0.002962 0.000700 4.228060 0.0010 
ECM(-1) -0.280583 0.122103 -2.297915 0.0388 
UC_HOSTILITY 1.389946 0.787542 1.764918 0.1010 
D(T_SAVING) 3974.828 1634.813 2.431366 0.0303 
D(T_FORINV) 90.77839 30.26133 2.999815 0.0102 
YR1977 484.8203 261.9934 1.850506 0.0871 
YR1984 -788.5143 285.6138 -2.760771 0.0162 
YR1987 -2368.394 646.0791 -3.665796 0.0029 
YR1991 -632.4980 316.5429 -1.998143 0.0671 
UC_VARIANCE(-1) -8.007584 4.332084 -1.848437 0.0874 
C -47.82844 144.9381 -0.329992 0.7467 
FITTED^2 3.33E-05 0.000171 0.195247 0.8482 
R-squared 0.942282     Mean dependent var 319.9200 
Adjusted R-squared 0.893443     S.D. dependent var 687.9171 
S.E. of regression 224.5571     Akaike info criterion 13.97221 
Sum squared resid 655536.7     Schwarz criterion 14.55727 
Log likelihood -162.6526     F-statistic 19.29380 












Table 5-8 Correlation Matrices for Multi-Collinearity Check on ECM 
 ECM  FIV   GNP    SAV  UC-H  UC-V  1977 1984 1987 1991 
ECM 1 -0.29 -0.01 0.34 0.04 -0.41 0.07 0.13 -0.33 -0.13 
FIN  -0.29 1 0.09 0.01 0.39 0.25 -0.22 -0.11 0.21 0.04 
GNP  -0.01 0.09 1 0.46 -0.09 0.4 -0.12 0.06 0.18 0.38 
SAV 0.34 0.01 0.46 1 -0.15 0.03 0.01 0.13 0.39 0.05 
UCH -0.04 0.39 -0.09 -0.15 1 0.29 -0.23 -0.04 0.04 0.03 
UCV  -0.41 0.25 0.4 0.03 0.29 1 -0.32 -0.23 0.12 0.26 
1977 0.07 -0.22 -0.12 0.01 -0.23 -0.32 1 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
1984 -0.13 -0.11 0.06 0.13 -0.04 -0.23 -0.04 1 -0.04 -0.04 
1987 -0.33 0.21 0.18 0.39 0.04 0.12 -0.04 -0.04 1 -0.04 



















Table 5-9 Incremental Model Estimates on Taiwan’s Military Spending, 1966-1992 
Dependent Variable: D(T_MILEXP) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 12/06/01   Time: 09:57 
Sample(adjusted): 1968 1992 
Included observations: 25 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
D(T_GNP(-1)) 0.002804 0.000422 6.651034 0.0000 
D(T_MILEXP(-1)) -0.160821 0.076945 -2.090066 0.0553 
UC_HOSTILITY 1.693025 0.753004 2.248360 0.0412 
D(T_SAVING) 3866.676 1660.767 2.328247 0.0354 
D(T_FORINV) 100.5635 30.49754 3.297430 0.0053 
YR1977 641.9665 264.0816 2.430939 0.0291 
YR1984 -1095.984 253.7602 -4.318975 0.0007 
YR1987 -2726.781 262.1508 -10.40157 0.0000 
YR1991 -538.2968 289.6426 -1.858486 0.0843 
UC_VARIANCE(-1) -2.018289 3.504782 -0.575867 0.5738 
C -126.0357 148.9366 -0.846237 0.4117 
R-squared 0.927443     Mean dependent var 319.9200 
Adjusted R-squared 0.875617     S.D. dependent var 687.9171 
S.E. of regression 242.6144     Akaike info criterion 14.12101 
Sum squared resid 824064.5     Schwarz criterion 14.65731 
Log likelihood -165.5126     F-statistic 17.89524 













Table 5-10 Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test on Incremental Model 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: 
F-statistic 2.827214     Probability 0.087922 
Obs*R-squared 16.98823     Probability 0.009327 
     
Test Equation: 
Dependent Variable: RESID 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 12/14/01   Time: 09:33 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic Prob.  
D(T_GNP(-1)) 0.000140 0.000328 0.428454 0.6796 
D(T_MILEXP(-1)) 0.045790 0.063798 0.717735 0.4933 
UC_HOSTILITY -0.212097 0.720513 -0.294369 0.7760 
D(T_SAVING) -1140.486 1744.988 -0.653578 0.5317 
D(T_FORINV) 1.036671 25.63670 0.040437 0.9687 
YR1977 -250.2598 261.8625 -0.955691 0.3672 
YR1984 -801.9719 318.9125 -2.514708 0.0361 
YR1987 142.8977 212.6421 0.672010 0.5205 
YR1991 -34.10233 237.0935 -0.143835 0.8892 
UC_VARIANCE(-1) -3.370420 2.914410 -1.156467 0.2809 
C 121.9923 131.2927 0.929162 0.3800 
RESID(-1) -0.234309 0.292252 -0.801735 0.4459 
RESID(-2) -0.213905 0.288056 -0.742582 0.4790 
RESID(-3) -0.612769 0.302689 -2.024422 0.0775 
RESID(-4) -0.661821 0.334748 -1.977073 0.0834 
RESID(-5) -0.835682 0.330126 -2.531401 0.0352 
RESID(-6) 0.577561 0.366760 1.574766 0.1540 
R-squared 0.679529     Mean dependent var 2.50E-14 
Adjusted R-squared 0.038588     S.D. dependent var 185.2998 
S.E. of regression 181.6895     Akaike info criterion 13.46304 
Sum squared resid 264088.5     Schwarz criterion 14.29188 
Log likelihood -151.2880     F-statistic 1.060205 








Table 5-11 ARCH Test on Incremental Model (BIM) 
ARCH Test: 
F-statistic 0.847396     Probability 0.367275 
Obs*R-squared 0.890145     Probability 0.345438 
     
Test Equation: 
Dependent Variable: RESID^2 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 12/14/01   Time: 16:44 
Sample(adjusted): 1969 1992 
Included observations: 24 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 27921.52 14221.27 1.963363 0.0624 
RESID^2(-1) 0.194003 0.210749 0.920541 0.3673 
R-squared 0.037089     Mean dependent var 33972.81 
Adjusted R-squared -0.006679     S.D. dependent var 61574.71 
S.E. of regression 61780.00     Akaike info criterion 24.98020 
Sum squared resid 8.40E+10     Schwarz criterion 25.07837 
Log likelihood -297.7624     F-statistic 0.847396 














Table 5-12 White Heteroskedasticity Test on BIM 
White Heteroskedasticity Test: 
F-statistic 0.639235     Probability 0.787850 
Obs*R-squared 14.02772     Probability 0.596648 
     
Test Equation: 
Dependent Variable: RESID^2 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 12/14/01   Time: 16:50 
Sample: 1968 1992 
Included observations: 25 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 212923.6 105774.4 2.012996 0.0789 
D(T_GNP(-1)) -0.342351 0.613999 -0.557575 0.5924 
(D(T_GNP(-1)))^2 9.53E-07 1.48E-06 0.644189 0.5375 
D(T_MILEXP(-1)) 19.17150 27.34460 0.701107 0.5031 
(D(T_MILEXP(-1)))^2 -0.001269 0.029585 -0.042901 0.9668 
UC_HOSTILITY -615.5328 1211.326 -0.508148 0.6251 
UC_HOSTILITY^2 0.989405 4.281026 0.231114 0.8230 
D(T_SAVING) -277061.8 647331.9 -0.428006 0.6799 
(D(T_SAVING))^2 -4886745. 12368688 -0.395090 0.7031 
D(T_FORINV) 11443.25 10275.90 1.113600 0.2978 
(D(T_FORINV))^2 -624.4457 2897.650 -0.215501 0.8348 
YR1977 -82808.56 86497.04 -0.957357 0.3664 
YR1984 -42898.42 84072.17 -0.510257 0.6236 
YR1987 4594.570 91755.79 0.050074 0.9613 
YR1991 -14872.00 108605.1 -0.136937 0.8945 
UC_VARIANCE(-1) -7265.056 3823.039 -1.900336 0.0939 
UC_VARIANCE(-1)̂ 2 86.46988 60.92837 1.419205 0.1936 
R-squared 0.561109     Mean dependent var 32962.58 
Adjusted R-squared -0.316673     S.D. dependent var 60489.52 
S.E. of regression 69409.53     Akaike info criterion 25.35400 
Sum squared resid 3.85E+10     Schwarz criterion 26.18284 
Log likelihood -299.9250     F-statistic 0.639235 







Table 5-13 Ramesy RESET Test on Specification and Stability of BIM 
Ramsey RESET Test: 
F-statistic 0.498836     Probability 0.492477 
Log likelihood ratio 0.941353     Probability 0.331930 
     
Test Equation: 
Dependent Variable: D(T_MILEXP) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 12/14/01   Time: 16:53 
Sample: 1968 1992 
Included observations: 25 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
D(T_GNP(-1)) 0.002383 0.000734 3.248273 0.0063 
D(T_MILEXP(-1)) -0.130591 0.089288 -1.462586 0.1673 
UC_HOSTILITY 1.347271 0.909789 1.480860 0.1625 
D(T_SAVING) 3399.039 1816.298 1.871410 0.0840 
D(T_FORINV) 90.80400 33.99370 2.671201 0.0192 
YR1977 552.2144 297.4504 1.856492 0.0862 
YR1984 -1113.642 259.6344 -4.289269 0.0009 
YR1987 -3138.405 641.0408 -4.895796 0.0003 
YR1991 -417.7957 340.7584 -1.226076 0.2419 
UC_VARIANCE(-1) -1.380383 3.681751 -0.374926 0.7138 
C -97.14950 157.0935 -0.618418 0.5470 
FITTED^2 0.000145 0.000205 0.706284 0.4925 
R-squared 0.930125     Mean dependent var 319.9200 
Adjusted R-squared 0.870999     S.D. dependent var 687.9171 
S.E. of regression 247.0771     Akaike info criterion 14.16335 
Sum squared resid 793612.0     Schwarz criterion 14.74841 
Log likelihood -165.0419     F-statistic 15.73139 







TABLE 5-14 Nested Model Estimates on Taiwan’s Military Spending, 1966-1992 
Dependent Variable: D(T_MILEXP) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 12/15/01   Time: 11:00 
Sample(adjusted): 1968 1992 
Included observations: 25 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
D(T_GNP(-1)) 0.003027 0.000458 6.611874 0.0000 
ECM(-1) -0.247793 0.134008 -1.849084 0.0892 
UC_HOSTILITY 1.528061 0.723357 2.112459 0.0563 
D(T_SAVING) 4111.073 1589.081 2.587076 0.0238 
D(T_FORINV) 96.07135 29.30562 3.278257 0.0066 
YR1977 521.1759 261.8165 1.990615 0.0698 
YR1984 -809.7294 291.6542 -2.776334 0.0168 
YR1987 -2332.127 331.2192 -7.041038 0.0000 
YR1991 -634.7557 295.8476 -2.145549 0.0531 
D(C_MILEXP(-1)) 0.000389 0.017958 0.021689 0.9831 
D(T_MILEXP(-1)) -0.051430 0.095296 -0.539683 0.5993 
UC_VARIANCE(-1) -7.375984 4.429885 -1.665051 0.1218 
C -60.34612 152.2765 -0.396293 0.6988 
R-squared 0.943538     Mean dependent var 319.9200 
Adjusted R-squared 0.887077     S.D. dependent var 687.9171 
S.E. of regression 231.1679     Akaike info criterion 14.03020 
Sum squared resid 641263.4     Schwarz criterion 14.66401 
Log likelihood -162.3775     F-statistic 16.71116 












Table 5-15 Breuch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test on Nested Model 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: 
F-statistic 0.777576     Probability 0.616089 
Obs*R-squared 10.93590     Probability 0.090378 
     
Test Equation: 
Dependent Variable: RESID 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 12/15/01   Time: 11:04 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
D(T_GNP(-1)) 0.000805 0.000817 0.984711 0.3628 
ECM(-1) 0.015436 0.355754 0.043390 0.9668 
UC_HOSTILITY -0.397138 1.335155 -0.297447 0.7762 
D(T_SAVING) 1652.079 2939.324 0.562061 0.5944 
D(T_FORINV) 13.51494 45.94212 0.294173 0.7785 
YR1977 -260.4487 403.2413 -0.645888 0.5423 
YR1984 -115.3617 1281.784 -0.090001 0.9312 
YR1987 227.4067 588.8391 0.386195 0.7127 
YR1991 -212.2526 344.9127 -0.615381 0.5609 
D(C_MILEXP(-1)) 0.025530 0.027702 0.921603 0.3923 
D(T_MILEXP(-1)) 0.013794 0.184758 0.074662 0.9429 
UC_VARIANCE(-1) -0.528306 7.162394 -0.073761 0.9436 
C -72.60313 204.7297 -0.354629 0.7350 
RESID(-1) -0.258064 0.703375 -0.366894 0.7263 
RESID(-2) -0.541918 0.918894 -0.589750 0.5769 
RESID(-3) -0.015335 0.619929 -0.024736 0.9811 
RESID(-4) -1.013124 0.591849 -1.711793 0.1378 
RESID(-5) -0.528825 0.893300 -0.591991 0.5755 
RESID(-6) -0.070839 1.290000 -0.054914 0.9580 
R-squared 0.437436     Mean dependent var -9.09E-15 
Adjusted R-squared -1.250256     S.D. dependent var 163.4604 
S.E. of regression 245.2045     Akaike info criterion 13.93495 
Sum squared resid 360751.6     Schwarz criterion 14.86129 
Log likelihood -155.1868     F-statistic 0.259192 








Table 5-16 ARCH Test on Nested Model (NM) 
ARCH Test: 
F-statistic 0.002652     Probability 0.959391 
Obs*R-squared 0.002893     Probability 0.957105 
     
Test Equation: 
Dependent Variable: RESID^2 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 12/15/01   Time: 11:07 
Sample(adjusted): 1969 1992 
Included observations: 24 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 26974.73 11031.87 2.445164 0.0229 
RESID^2(-1) -0.011689 0.226972 -0.051501 0.9594 
R-squared 0.000121     Mean dependent var 26713.82 
Adjusted R-squared -0.045329     S.D. dependent var 46956.31 
S.E. of regression 48008.75     Akaike info criterion 24.47581 
Sum squared resid 5.07E+10     Schwarz criterion 24.57398 
Log likelihood -291.7097     F-statistic 0.002652 














Table 5-17 White Heteroskedasticity Test on NM 
White Heteroskedasticity Test: 
F-statistic 0.485830     Probability 0.875394 
Obs*R-squared 17.70956     Probability 0.606534 
     
Test Equation: 
Dependent Variable: RESID^2 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 12/15/01   Time: 11:08 
Sample: 1968 1992 
Included observations: 25 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 252456.1 158172.4 1.596082 0.1857 
D(T_GNP(-1)) -1.172657 1.362065 -0.860940 0.4378 
(D(T_GNP(-1)))^2 3.15E-06 3.11E-06 1.012495 0.3686 
ECM(-1) 55.41948 100.7792 0.549910 0.6116 
ECM(-1)̂ 2 0.001599 0.075946 0.021060 0.9842 
UC_HOSTILITY -508.5565 1376.053 -0.369576 0.7304 
UC_HOSTILITY^2 1.830573 4.929904 0.371320 0.7292 
D(T_SAVING) -2269962. 1338257. -1.696208 0.1651 
(D(T_SAVING))^2 17461091 22280886 0.783680 0.4770 
D(T_FORINV) 13692.54 17008.55 0.805039 0.4659 
(D(T_FORINV)) 2̂ -6892.969 3774.511 -1.826189 0.1419 
YR1977 -23481.54 84739.84 -0.277102 0.7954 
YR1984 -32367.89 112352.0 -0.288093 0.7876 
YR1987 -29413.76 101592.7 -0.289526 0.7866 
YR1991 -65687.06 101135.6 -0.649495 0.5514 
D(C_MILEXP(-1)) 15.98458 10.18206 1.569876 0.1915 
(D(C_MILEXP(-1)))^2 -0.003701 0.001799 -2.057202 0.1088 
D(T_MILEXP(-1)) 17.25317 36.36339 0.474465 0.6599 
(D(T_MILEXP(-1)))^2 -0.046787 0.037548 -1.246079 0.2807 
UC_VARIANCE(-1) -6250.976 4628.650 -1.350497 0.2482 
UC_VARIANCE(-1)̂ 2 79.55771 69.31685 1.147740 0.3151 
R-squared 0.708382     Mean dependent var 25650.54 
Adjusted R-squared -0.749706     S.D. dependent var 46274.06 
S.E. of regression 61209.68     Akaike info criterion 24.72942 
Sum squared resid 1.50E+10     Schwarz criterion 25.75327 
Log likelihood -288.1177     F-statistic 0.485830 






Table 5-18 Ramsey RESET Test on Specification and Stability of N M 
Ramsey RESET Test: 
F-statistic 0.074172     Probability 0.790401 
Log likelihood ratio 0.168007     Probability 0.681889 
     
Test Equation: 
Dependent Variable: D(T_MILEXP) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 12/15/01   Time: 11:11 
Sample: 1968 1992 
Included observations: 25 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
D(T_GNP(-1)) 0.002859 0.000781 3.661228 0.0037 
ECM(-1) -0.228321 0.156753 -1.456562 0.1732 
UC_HOSTILITY 1.418057 0.854479 1.659556 0.1252 
D(T_SAVING) 3943.544 1764.846 2.234497 0.0472 
D(T_FORINV) 92.65008 32.99135 2.808314 0.0170 
YR1977 498.7348 284.7250 1.751637 0.1076 
YR1984 -836.9813 319.6660 -2.618299 0.0239 
YR1987 -2502.962 715.7874 -3.496795 0.0050 
YR1991 -585.2100 357.6856 -1.636102 0.1301 
D(C_MILEXP(-1)) 0.000685 0.018725 0.036609 0.9715 
D(T_MILEXP(-1)) -0.050092 0.099321 -0.504340 0.6240 
UC_VARIANCE(-1) -6.808771 5.059854 -1.345646 0.2055 
C -53.16009 160.6952 -0.330813 0.7470 
FITTED^2 5.06E-05 0.000186 0.272345 0.7904 
R-squared 0.943917     Mean dependent var 319.9200 
Adjusted R-squared 0.877636     S.D. dependent var 687.9171 
S.E. of regression 240.6371     Akaike info criterion 14.10348 
Sum squared resid 636968.4     Schwarz criterion 14.78605 
Log likelihood -162.2935     F-statistic 14.24126 
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Std. Dev.   165.5117
Skewness  -0.170479
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